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Abstract 
Institutions that serve the interests of an elite are often cited as an important reason for poor economic 
performance. This paper builds a model of institutions that allocate resources and power to maximize 
the payoff of an elite, but where any group that exerts sufficient fighting effort can launch a rebellion 
that destroys the existing institutions. The rebels are then able to establish new institutions as a new 
elite, which will similarly face threats of rebellion. The paper analyses the economic consequences of 
the institutions that emerge as the equilibrium of this struggle for power. High levels of economic 
activity depend on protecting private property from expropriation, but the model predicts this can only 
be achieved if power is not as concentrated as the elite would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing 
endogenously enables the elite to act as a government committed to property rights, which would 
otherwise be time inconsistent. But sharing power entails sharing rents, so in equilibrium power is too 
concentrated, leading to inefficiently low investment. 
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Princes who want to make themselves
despotic have always begun by uniting
all magistracies in their person.
Montesquieu (1748), De l’esprit des lois
1 Introduction
Economic activity is influenced by the rules that prevail in a society, whether those rules be decreeing
taxes and transfers, regulating markets, enforcing private property, or limiting the arbitrary exercise
of government power. These rules depend on a country’s institutions, but what in turn explains
which institutions will arise in a given place and time?
This question is important because many researchers have posited institutions as a significant
determinant of economic development and the large differences found in the cross-country distri-
bution of income.1 Inefficient rules are often attributed to institutions serving the interests of an
elite rather than the interests of society as a whole. However, why does elite control of a country’s
institutions have more than just distributional consequences? Why would an elite have incentives
to set up institutions that shrink the total pie?
The institutions designed by elites are likely to reflect the constraints imposed by their desire to
remain in power. Thus, to analyse the economic consequences of control of institutions by an elite,
it is necessary to think about how groups come to power and what they do to remain there. This
paper proposes a model of institutions that emerge as the equilibrium of this struggle for power, in
a world of ex-ante identical individuals. Institutions serve the interests of those in power, but can
be overthrown by any group willing to exert enough fighting effort to defeat those defending them.
The power struggle is represented by a simple “conflict technology” that encompasses all different
types of “rebellions” from “popular uprisings” to “coups d’e´tat”, with no exogenous restrictions
placed on the groups that can fight for power.
The exogenous “technology” available to create institutions is basic. In the model, institutions
control the allocation of resources and power among the individuals in a society. This means that
institutions can mandate any transfers of goods between different individuals. “Power” is a primitive
that gives its holder an advantage in the conflict that would occur if a group decides to rebel against
the current institutions. Elites are free to design institutions stipulating the allocation of resources
and power without any restrictions other than surviving the power struggle, that is, avoiding rebel-
lions. In this environment, is it possible for rules such as private property to emerge and survive,
without directly assuming they are on the menu of institutional choices? And would institutions
supporting such rules be chosen by the group in power given the constraints endogenously imposed
by the power struggle?
The challenge is that many rules necessary for economic efficiency require restrictions on the
untrammelled exercise of the elite’s power. For example, evidence suggests institutions guaranteeing
1For example, see North (1990), North and Weingast (1989), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)
and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).
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private property against expropriation are especially important in supporting high levels of economic
activity (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). A system of private property requires that transfers such
as expropriation are not made, even if they are physically feasible and in the interests of those in
power at the time. Elites will always want to ensure they are sufficiently strong to survive the
power struggle, but there needs to be a means of preventing them also using their power to sweep
aside existing rules and reshaping institutions to conform to their ex post interests. The problem is
essentially the classic question of “who will guard the guardians?”
This question might call to mind such notions as “independent judiciaries”, “the rule of law”,
“political representation”, and the like. While it would be possible to introduce such devices into the
model by assumption, this would be as a deus ex machina that simply overrides the ability of mem-
bers of the elite to exploit their own power. Introducing an exogenous “higher-level” institutional
technology that directly allows for the protection of property rights (perhaps at some cost) would
not do justice to the question at hand if the aim is to understand why or why not such features of
institutions arise in equilibrium. Importantly, as it turns out, institutions that do protect property
rights may arise endogenously without adding any extra assumptions to the model that explicitly
allow for this.
The analysis of the model starts from a point where new institutions are being established,
which will determine the group in power and the taxes and transfers that will be imposed. The
new institutions are chosen to maximize the payoff of the group now in power. Once they have
been created, there are opportunities for rebellions, to which all individuals have access on the same
terms. Rebellion is the only way of changing institutions, so if no rebellions occur, economic activity
takes place and the allocation of resources laid down by the prevailing institutions is implemented.
If a successful rebellion does occur, the current institutions are destroyed and the model is back at
the stage of establishing new ones, which will now reflect the interests of the group that emerged
victorious from the foregoing conflict.
There is complete information about incentives to rebel, and the conflict technology is non-
stochastic, so the goal of any elite is designing institutions in its own interests subject to no group of
individuals having an incentive to launch a viable rebellion. By doing this, no rebellions will occur
in equilibrium, hence no inefficiencies will result from actual conflict. Incentives to rebel depend
on the payoffs the rebels expect to receive as the new elite when new institutions are subsequently
established. Hence the equilibrium institutions are the fixed point of the constrained maximization
problem of the elite in power subject to the threat of rebellion, where subsequent elites would be
similarly constrained by equivalent threats of rebellion. As in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, there
is no essential difference between the “pigs” and the “men” they replace, but in equilibrium, some
individuals will be “more equal” than others.
In an endowment economy, the model gives rise to a simple theory of distribution. The distri-
bution of resources is uniquely determined and tied to the distribution of power. Those with equal
power receive the same payoff, and those with more power receive a higher payoff. The intuition is
that in comparing two individuals of equal power, the one with the lower payoff has more to gain
from rebellion and is therefore willing to exert more fighting effort; while comparing two individuals
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with the same payoff, the one with more power poses a greater danger if he supports a rebellion
because of his superior fighting strength. Since any rebellion will be launched by a subset of the
population, the elite would like to minimize the fighting strength of the rebellion comprising the
group of individuals with the greatest incentive to fight. This means rewarding the powerful to keep
them on side, while otherwise equalizing payoffs to avoid concentrating disenchantment with the
institutions. Sharing power thus always entails sharing rents.
There is a basic trade-off in this environment that characterizes the equilibrium institutions. On
the one hand, the greater the number of individuals sharing power inside the elite, the greater their
ability to defend the institutions they establish against rebellions, which allows them to levy higher
taxes on those outside the elite. On the other hand, the proceeds must then be divided more thinly
among more individuals. The equilibrium elite size maximizes the payoff of an elite member by
striking a balance between these two effects.
Are institutions that are designed to maximize the payoff of those in power ever consistent
with efficient outcomes? In some cases, the answer turns out to be yes. For example, suppose
there is a technology that transforms rivalrous consumption goods into a public good that benefits
everyone, and which has no impact on any other aspect of the environment. Such a public good will
be optimally provided by the elite in equilibrium, as if its provision were chosen by a benevolent
government. The intuition is that the elite must consider the impact of its choices on everyone
because of the threat of rebellion. Provision of public goods reduces the incentive to rebel, just
as higher taxes increase it. Since institutions can specify any transfers between individuals, the
elite has incentives to choose institutions supporting a Pareto-improving “deal” to provide public
goods in exchange for higher taxes, and no group has an incentive to rebel against this. Here, the
contestability of institutions through rebellions leads to an efficient outcome, even though the gains
may not be distributed equally.
To explore whether the equilibrium institutions support economic efficiency in other settings,
the model is extended so that individuals have access to an investment technology. Individuals who
invest incur an immediate effort cost, while the fruits of their investment are realized only after a
lag. During this time, there is the ever-present opportunity for any group of individuals to launch
a rebellion against the prevailing institutions. Were a rebellion to occur after investments have
been made, the group in power following the rebellion would have incentives to expropriate fully
investors’ capital because the effort cost of investing is now sunk.
To provide appropriate incentives for individuals to invest, the institutions established prior
to investment decisions must offer investors a higher payoff, and importantly, those institutions
must survive rebellions so that what they prescribe is actually put into practice. In an endowment
economy, the elite’s principal concern is in avoiding a “popular uprising”, a rebellion of outsiders.
When offering incentives to investors, the danger of this type of rebellion increases, but it becomes
essential also to avoid a “coup d’e´tat”, a rebellion launched by insiders. The higher payoff enjoyed
by investors is only in the interests of the elite ex ante, so ex post there is a time-inconsistency
problem. In other words, the members of the elite themselves want to rebel against the existing
institutions so they can rewrite the rules protecting investors’ private property.
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It is therefore necessary to reduce the incentive to rebel for those inside and outside the elite
simultaneously. This can only be done by expanding the size of the elite — the problem cannot
be solved with any system of transfers. If higher payoffs were offered to some to reduce their
willingness to rebel, resources must be taken away from others, increasing their incentive to rebel.
Fundamentally, transfers can only redistribute disgruntlement with the institutions. In contrast,
enlarging the elite reduces the attractiveness of all types of rebellions by increasing the number of
individuals who will lose power if a rebellion succeeds. This increases the size of the group willing
to defend the current institutions.
Simply adding the possibility of investment to the model therefore gives rise to an equilibrium
with power sharing among a larger elite. Sharing power is an endogenous commitment mechanism
that allows the elite to act as a government bound to a set of policies that would otherwise be time
inconsistent. The analysis thus highlights the importance of sharing power as a way of guaranteeing
the stability of institutions, allowing in particular for incentives to invest. This resonates with
Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers, now accepted and followed in well-functioning
systems of government. Note that power is not shared here with those individuals who are actually
investing. The additional individuals in the elite in no sense represent nor care about those who
invest — but they do care about their own rents under the status quo. By this means, a group of
self-interested individuals is able to act a government that commits to protection of property rights.
Although it is possible to sustain protection against expropriation by sharing power among a
sufficiently large group, in equilibrium, there is too little power sharing and thus too little protection
of property rights. In other words, capital taxation is too high, and investment is inefficiently low.
Total output available for consumption could be increased by having a larger group in power to
reduce the proportion of investors’ returns that is expropriated. But the equilibrium institutions
fail to generate this efficient outcome. The intuition comes from the inseparability of power and
rents, which follows from the threat posed by powerful individuals were conflict to occur. It is not
possible in equilibrium for the elite to share power with more individuals yet not grant them the
same payoff as their equally strong peers. This places an endogenous and binding limit on the set
of possible transfers, so Pareto-improving deals remain unfulfilled.
While the model is quite abstract, it is congruent with a number of historical examples, two of
which are discussed later in the paper: the disappearance of private corporations (the societas pub-
licanorum) when power was concentrated under the Roman emperors, and the tenacious resistance
of the Stuart kings of England to sharing power with parliament.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first discusses how the paper relates to and
differs from other contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the basic model of power and
distribution. The benchmark case of public-good provision is briefly studied in section 4, after which
private investment is analysed in section 5. Finally, section 6 draws some conclusions.
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2 Comparison with the existing literature
Since Downs (1957) emphasized the importance of studying governments composed of self-interested
agents, a vast literature on political economy has flourished (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini,
2000). Most of this literature focuses on democracies, so institutions are not themselves explained
in terms of the decisions of self-interested agents. But in much of the developing world and during
most of human history, political regimes have differed greatly from democracies.
Recently, some models have been developed with the aim of understanding institutions them-
selves. Greif (2006) combines a rich historical analysis of trade and institutions in medieval times
with economic modelling, part of which focuses on the form of government and political institutions
that emerged in Genoa. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008) analyse the conditions leading to
democracy or dictatorship in an environment where an elite is trying to maintain its power, while
citizens prefer a more egalitarian state. In Besley and Persson (2009a,b, 2010), society comprises
two groups of agents that alternate in power, and make investments in two technologies that re-
spectively allow the state to tax and to enforce contracts. Differently from these contributions, this
paper aims to make primitive assumptions only on the mechanisms through which institutions are
created and destroyed, while imposing no other restrictions on agents’ choices. Hence there is a
more basic institutional technology and no ex-ante differences among individuals, and there are no
relevant constraints on the choice of institutions besides the threat of rebellions. In our view, this
makes this paper more suited to studying the constraints on institutions that arise.
This paper shares some features of the literature on coalition formation (see Ray, 2007).2 As in
that literature, the process of establishing rules is non-cooperative, but it is assumed in the absence
of rebellion that such rules are followed. Moreover, the modelling of rebellions here is related to the
idea of blocking in coalitions (Ray, 2007, part III) in the sense that there is no explicit game-form.
What distinguishes this paper is the actual modelling of power, rebellions, and conflict.
The model assumes that if the institutions established by the elite survive the power struggle
then they do indeed determine the allocation of resources once production has taken place. But
how would these institutions manage to control the allocation of goods ex post? As pointed out
by Basu (2000) and Mailath, Morris and Postlewaite (2001), laws and institutions do not change
the physical nature of the game, all they can do is affect how agents coordinate on some pattern of
behaviour. But in reality, laws and institutions are seen to have a strong impact on behaviour, and
this feature must be present in any model for those institutions that do not trigger rebellions.
One possible interpretation of the approach in this paper is similar to the application put forward
by Myerson (2009) of Schelling’s (1960) notion of focal points in the organization of society. The
“rules of the game” are self enforcing as long as society coordinates on punishing whomever deviates
from the rules — and whomever deviates from punishing the deviator. Following this, theorizing
about institutions is theorizing about (i) how rules (or focal points) are chosen, and (ii) how rules
can change. For example, Myerson (2004) explores the idea of justice as a focal point influencing the
2Baron and Ferejohn (1989) analyse bargaining in legislatures using this approach, while Levy (2004) studies
political parties as coalitions. Other recent contributions include Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2008) and Piccione
and Razin (2009).
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allocation of resources in society. This paper takes a more cynical view of our fellow human beings:
those in power choose the laws and institutions to maximize their own payoffs, and institutions can
only be destroyed by rebellions. There is no modelling of the post-production game.
This paper is also related to the literature on social conflict and predation, surveyed by Garfinkel
and Skaperdas (2007).3 It is easy to envisage how conflict could be important in a state of nature:
individuals could devote their time to fighting and stealing from others. However, when there are
fights, there are deadweight losses. Thus, it would be efficient if individuals could agree on transfers
to avoid conflict. This paper supposes such deals are possible: individuals pay taxes to the group
in power, which allocates resources according to some predetermined rules. Here, differently from
the literature on conflict, individuals fight to be part of the group that sets the rules, not directly
over what has been produced. Moreover, they fight in groups, not as isolated individuals.
Acemoglu (2003) raises the question of why institutions can be inefficient (a breakdown of what
is termed the “political Coase theorem”) and highlights the importance of commitment problems.
Commitment is indeed the key issue in the main application of the model of this paper, but the
question here is the means by which commitment can arise endogenously, and whether the group in
power has sufficient incentives to make use of the endogenous commitment mechanism. There are
other theoretical models focused on political issues that lead to inefficiencies in protecting property
rights. Examples include Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003), Acemoglu (2008), Guriev and
Sonin (2009), and Myerson (2010). Here, the risk of expropriation of capital and the consequent
need to protect property rights is just a natural consequence of the possibility of investment and
the “rebellion technology” that allows institutions to be destroyed and replaced.
Lastly, it is possible to draw an analogy between this paper and models of democracy (for
example, in Persson and Tabellini, 2000) in the sense that the “election technology” there is replaced
by a “rebellion technology” here.
3 The model of power and distribution
This section presents an analysis of the equilibrium institutions in a simple endowment economy.
Subsequent sections apply the model developed here to economies with added production technolo-
gies.
3.1 Preferences and technologies
There is an area containing a measure-one population of ex-ante identical individuals indexed by
ı ∈ Ω. Individuals receive utility U from their own consumption C of a homogeneous good and
disutility if they exert fighting effort F :
U = u(C)− F, [3.1]
3For instance, see Grossman and Kim (1995) and Hirshleifer (1995).
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where u(·) is a strictly increasing and weakly concave function. Individuals who become workers
receive an exogenous endowment of q units of goods per worker.
3.2 Institutions
Institutions stipulate the distribution of resources and power. They specify the set W of workers,
and the set P of individuals currently in power, referred to as the elite. Each position of power
confers an equal advantage on its holder in the event of any conflict, as described below. The elite
P can have any size between 0% and 50% of the population. Those individuals in power cannot
simultaneously be workers.4
Institutions specify the transfers of goods that are made between individuals. A worker ı ∈ W
facing an individual-specific tax τ(ı) (or transfer if negative) consumes
Cw(ı) = q− τ(ı). [3.2]
Tax revenue is used to finance the consumption of the elite. If Cp(ı) is the individual-specific
consumption of a member of the elite ı ∈ P then the overall budget constraint is∫
P
Cp(ı)dı =
∫
W
τ(ı)dı. [3.3]
Any system of transfers is physically feasible subject only to this budget constraint and non-
negativity constraints on the consumption of each individual.
Formally, institutions are a collection I = {P ,W , τ(ı), Cp(ı)}, where the sets P and W satisfy
P ∪W = Ω, P ∩W = ∅, and |P| < 1/2 (with | · | denoting the measure of a set), and where the tax
and consumption distributions τ(ı) and Cp(ı) are consistent with the budget constraint [3.3] and
non-negativity constraints.
Once institutions exist, the allocation of resources and power they decree prevails unless a suc-
cessful rebellion occurs. Rebellions are the only means of changing institutions, and are explained
in detail below.
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 1. Institutions are established. There are then
opportunities for rebellions. If a successful rebellion occurs, new institutions are established, followed
by more opportunities for rebellions. When no rebellions occur, workers receive their endowments,
the rules laid down by the prevailing institutions are implemented, and payoffs are received.
New institutions are created as soon as a rebellion has destroyed existing ones, or if no institutions
previously existed. The fundamental assumption is that institutions are set up to maximize the
average of the payoffs Up(ı) of those who will be in the elite (ı ∈ P). The choice variables are the
taxes τ(ı) levied on workers (ı ∈ W), the consumption Cp(ı) of members of the elite, and the status
of each individual, that is, an assignment of each ı ∈ Ω to one of the sets P or W .
4The assumption that those in power do not receive the endowments of workers is not essential for the main
results. It does mean that there is an opportunity cost of individuals being in power, so strictly speaking, this is not
a pure endowment economy. However, the resulting “guns versus butter” inefficiency is not the focus of this paper.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events
Production,
taxes, payoffs
New
institutions
Rebellion?
yes
no
No
institutions
The maximization problem for new institutions is subject only to the following constraints. The
basic feasibility conditions (budget constraint, non-negativity constraints, and maximum number of
individuals in power) must be respected. There must be no profitable opportunity for any group to
rebel, as described below. An elite selection function E (·) must be respected, which determines the
identities of those who are to be in the elite, conditional on the elite having size p.
Formally, the elite selection function E (·) is a mapping E : [0, 1/2) → P, with P denoting
the set of (measurable) subsets of Ω. It has two properties: |E (p)| = p for all p ∈ [0, 1/2), and
E (p1) ⊆ E (p2) if p1 ≤ p2. If p is the size (measure) of the elite, the constraint imposed by the elite
selection function is P = E (p). The function E (·) itself is a state variable that was set down at
the time of the previous rebellion, or in the case of no previous institutions, was randomly chosen
by nature. The elite selection function is such that any larger elite would necessarily include those
already selected to join a smaller elite, so it can be thought of as specifying individuals’ priority in
receiving positions of power, in other words, the “pecking order” in society.
Finally, in cases where a non-degenerate distribution of taxes τ(ı) or elite consumption Cp(ı) is
chosen, each individual’s tax and consumption level must be a random draw from the corresponding
distribution. Every individual’s draw becomes known as soon as the institutions are set up.
3.3 Rebellions
A successful rebellion destroys the existing institutions and defines a new elite selection function,
which will be a state variable when new institutions are subsequently formed. If a rebellion occurs,
all individuals know the new elite selection function that will be put in place if it succeeds.
A rebellion is successful if the fighting strength of its rebel army R is sufficiently large. The rebel
army is the set of all individuals satisfying two conditions. First, members must anticipate receiving
a payoff under the post-rebellion institutions at least as high as what they would receive under the
current institutions. Second, members must anticipate receiving a place in the post-rebellion elite.
Formally, a particular rebellion can be entirely characterized by the new elite selection function
E ′(·) it stipulates. In what follows, the notation ′ indicates the post-rebellion value of a variable.
Consider a particular elite selection function E ′(·). The conditions defining the membership of
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the rebel army depend on beliefs about the new institutions I ′ = {P ′,W ′, τ ′(ı), C ′p(ı)} that would
be created after the rebellion. Let p′e denote beliefs about the post-rebellion elite size p′ = |P ′|.
If the rebellion succeeds, individuals in the set E ′(p′e) anticipate a place in the new elite. Let U ′ep
denote the expected utility of such individuals once the new institutions are in place, and U ′ew the
expected utility of those individuals who anticipate being workers under the new institutions:
U ′ep =
1
p′e
∫
E ′(p′e)
u(C ′ep ())d, and U ′ew =
1
1− p′e
∫
Ω\E ′(p′e)
u(q− τ ′e())d. [3.4]
Now take an individual ı ∈ E ′(p′e) who anticipates a place in the post-rebellion elite. The utility
of this individual under the prevailing institutions I = {P ,W , τ(ı), Cp(ı)} is denoted by U(ı),
noting that this individual could be inside or outside the current elite. Such an individual (weakly)
gains from the success of the rebellion if U ′ep ≥ U(ı). The set F comprises all individuals for whom
this inequality holds, and the rebel army R raised by the rebellion with new elite selection function
E ′(·) is thus
R = F ∩ E ′(p′e), with F = {ı ∈ Ω | U ′ep ≥ U(ı)}. [3.5]
In the event of a rebellion occurring, the survival of the current institutions rests on the incumbent
army A, the set of individuals defending the institutions. An individual belongs to the incumbent
army if three conditions are met. First, the individual is in power (ı ∈ P) under the current
institutions. Second, the individual does not join the rebel army (ı /∈ R) according to the criteria
set out above. Third, given beliefs about the post-rebellion institutions, the individual expects a
lower payoff than under the current institutions. The incumbent army is thus given by
A = D\R, with D = {ı ∈ P | Up(ı) > U ′ew}, [3.6]
where D denotes the set of elite members who stand to gain by defending the current institutions.5
The outcome of a rebellion is determined by which of the rebel and incumbent armies has the
greater fighting strength. Each army’s fighting strength is the integral of the fighting strengths of
its members. The fighting strength of individual ı ∈ R in the rebel army is the amount of fighting
effort F (ı) he exerts, which is assumed to equal to the maximum the individual would be willing to
put in to change the institutions. This is the difference between the individual’s payoff under the
current institutions U(ı) and his anticipated payoff under the post-rebellion institutions U ′ep . Each
individual ı ∈ A in the incumbent army has fighting strength measured by the parameter δ, which
is obtained at no utility cost to these individuals. The rebellion succeeds if and only if∫
R
F (ı)dı >
∫
A
δdı, where F (ı) = U ′ep − U(ı). [3.7]
All new elite selection functions are feasible when launching a rebellion, so if [3.7] holds for any
E ′(·) then the current institutions will be destroyed. If [3.7] holds for multiple E ′(·) then one of
5This definition assumes without loss of generality that those in power who do not join the rebel army anticipate
becoming workers if the rebellion succeeds.
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these new elite selection functions is randomly chosen.
Although the term rebellion has been used to describe the process of destroying the current
institutions, the formal definition encompasses “popular uprisings” (the rebel army comprises only
workers), “coups d’e´tat” (the rebel army is a subset of the current elite), “suspensions of the con-
stitution” (the rebel army includes all members of the current elite), and “revolutions” that receive
the backing of some insiders from the current regime (the rebel army includes a mixture of workers
and elite members).
3.4 Establishing institutions
The constrained maximization problem for the new institutions I = {P ,W , τ(ı), Cp(ı)} reduces to
a choice of the extent of power sharing (the elite size, denoted by p), and distributions of taxes and
elite consumption, denoted by τ(·) and Cp(·):
max
p,τ(·),Cp(·)
1
p
∫
E (p)
Up(ı)dı subject to the budget constraint [3.3], C(ı) ≥ 0, p < 1/2,
and for all E ′(·) :
∫
R
F (ı)dı ≤
∫
A
δdı, where F (ı), R and A are given by [3.4]–[3.7].
[3.8]
Given the solution {p, τ(·), Cp(·)}, the current predetermined elite selection function E (·) determines
P = E (p) andW = Ω\E (p), and each individual’s τ(ı) or Cp(ı) is drawn from the distributions τ(·)
and Cp(·) if these are non-degenerate. The new institutions solving this constrained maximization
problem will not trigger any rebellions, hence no further fighting effort F (ı) is exerted by any
individual. Since any past fighting effort is sunk, the utility function [3.1] implies that payoffs of
elite members and workers are Up(ı) = u(Cp(ı)) and Uw(ı) = u(q− τ(ı)) respectively.
In the absence of any uncertainty, beliefs about subsequent institutions must coincide with
outcomes, that is, p′e = p′, U ′ep = U ′p, and U ′ew = U ′w. Determining the equilibrium institutions thus
requires knowledge of the equilibrium that would prevail when new institutions are set up following
a rebellion. But finding the equilibrium institutions at that subsequent stage means solving a
constrained maximization problem of the same form as [3.8] in that any subsequent elite would also
be subject to threats of rebellion. These threats mean that the post-post-rebellion equilibrium p′′,
U ′′p , and U ′′w needs to be known to determine the post-rebellion outcomes p′, U ′p, and U ′w, and so on
recursively, ad infinitum.
At every point at which new institutions can be formed, attention is restricted to institutions
that depend only on fundamental state variables. Formally, Markovian institutions are a collection
{p, τ(·), Cp(·)} that is a function only of those state variables actually affecting which institutional
choices are physically feasible now or in the future, rather than of the entire history at that point.
A Markovian equilibrium is a set of Markovian institutions {p∗, τ ∗(·), C∗p(·)} solving the constrained
maximization problem [3.8], where the institutions that would be set up following any subsequent
rebellions are expected to be Markovian solutions of the corresponding constrained maximization
problems.
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In the simple endowment economy model, the only state variable is the elite selection function
E (·). While this state variable is relevant for determining the identities of the elite, the maximum
attainable average elite payoff in the constrained maximization problem [3.8] is unaffected by the
particular elite selection function in force because all individuals are ex ante identical. Thus, there
are in fact no relevant state variables in the problem of finding the optimal {p, τ(·), Cp(·)}. The
Markovian equilibrium {p∗, τ ∗(·), C∗p(·)} is then found in two steps. First, the solution of [3.8]
is obtained taking as given a particular set of subsequent institutions {p′, τ ′(·), C ′p(·)}. Second,
the equilibrium conditions of an identical elite size p′ = p∗ and identical distributions of taxes
τ ′(·) = τ ∗(·) and elite consumption C ′p(·) = C∗p(·) are imposed, where the latter conditions can be
stated precisely as P[τ ∗(ı) ≤ τ] = P[τ ′(ı) ≤ τ] for all τ, and P[C∗p(ı) ≤ C] = P[C ′p(ı) ≤ C] for all
C. This fixed-point problem can be solved without reference to the elite selection function, which
is then used only to pin down the identities of the elite.
3.5 Equilibrium
Proposition 1 Any Markovian equilibrium must have the following properties:
(i) Equalization of workers’ payoffs: U∗w(ı) = U∗w for all ı ∈ W (with measure one).
(ii) Sharing power implies sharing rents: U∗p(ı) = U∗p for all ı ∈ P (with measure one).
(iii) Power determines rents: U∗p − U∗w = δ.
(iv) The equilibrium institutions can be characterized by solving the maximization problem [3.8]
subject only to a single “no-rebellion” constraint:
U ′p − Uw ≤ δ
p
p′
. [3.9]
(v) A Markovian equilibrium always exists and is unique. The equilibrium elite size p∗ satisfies
0 < p∗ ≤ 2−ϕ, where ϕ ≡ (1 +√5)/2 ≈ 1.618.6
Proof See appendix A.1. 
The first two parts of the proposition demonstrate that the elite has a strong incentive to avoid
inequality except where it is justified by differences in power. These results hold even when the
utility function is linear in consumption, and so do not depend on strict concavity.
The intuition for the payoff-equalization results is that the most dangerous composition of the
rebel army is the one including those individuals with the greatest incentive to fight. A rebel
army will always be a subset of the whole population. As a consequence, if there were payoff
inequality among workers, the most dangerous rebel army would not include those workers who
6A necessary and sufficient condition for all non-negativity constraints on consumption to be slack in equilibrium is
δ/u′(0)q < 1+q/u−1(u(0)+δ), with δ/u′(0)q < 1 being sufficient for this. The condition δ/u′(0)q > ϕ is sufficient for
an equilibrium in which the non-negativity constraint on workers’ consumption is binding. The term ϕ ≡ (1 +√5)/2
is known as the Golden ratio or mean of Phidias. The constraint p < 1/2 is always slack in equilibrium.
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receive a relatively high payoff. The elite could then reduce the effectiveness of this rebel army by
redistributing from relatively well-off workers to the worse off. This slackens the set of no-rebellion
constraints, allowing the elite to achieve a higher payoff. The elite’s tax policy exploits these gains
to the maximum possible extent when all workers’ payoffs are equalized.7 Similarly, inequality in
elite payoffs is undesirable because elite members receiving a relatively low payoff can defect and join
a rebel army. Equalizing elite payoffs by redistributing consumption does not directly lower average
elite utility when the utility function is weakly concave, while it has the advantage of weakening the
most dangerous rebel army. Since defections from the elite weaken the incumbent army, there is no
version of this argument that calls for equalization of payoffs between workers and the elite.
Given that workers receive equal endowments q, payoff equalization implies all workers pay
the same tax τ . Payoff equalization among the elite implies that all members receive the same
consumption level Cp, which can be found using the budget constraint [3.3]. Thus:
Uw = u(Cw) = u(q− τ), and Up = u(Cp) = u
(
(1− p)τ
p
)
. [3.10]
As a consequence of the payoff-equalization results, all that matters for the composition of a rebel
army are the fractions σw and σp of its total numbers drawn from workers and from the current
elite. The equilibrium institutions solving [3.8] are then the solution of the simpler problem
max
p,τ
Up s.t. σw max{U ′p − Uw, 0}+ σp(U ′p − Up + δ)1[U ′p ≥ Up] ≤ δ
p
p′
, [3.11]
for all non-negative proportions σw and σp that are feasible given the size of the rebel army p
′
and the sizes of the groups of workers and elite members under the current institutions, that is,
σw ≤ (1−p)/p′, σp ≤ p/p′, and σw +σp = 1. The general form of the no-rebellion constraints stated
in [3.11] is derived from the participation constraints on membership of the rebel and incumbent
armies described in equations [3.4]–[3.7],8 with 1[·] denoting the indicator function.
The fourth claim in Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium institutions can be characterized
by a single “no-rebellion” constraint [3.9], which is equivalent to setting σw = 1 and σp = 0 in
the general constraints of [3.11] (and noting that U ′p will exceed Uw in a Markovian equilibrium).
Satisfaction of [3.9] is clearly necessary, but the proposition shows that this single constraint is also
sufficient to characterize the Markovian equilibrium institutions.9 The constrained maximization
problem thus reduces to
max
p,τ
Up s.t. U ′p − Uw ≤ δ
p
p′
, [3.12]
7This result is different from those found in some models of electoral competition such as Myerson (1993). In the
equilibrium of that model, politicians offer different payoffs to different agents. But there is a similarity with the
model here because in neither case will agents’ payoffs depend on their initial endowments.
8The requirement Up > U ′w that elite members who do not join a rebel army are willing to defend the current
institutions is always satisfied in equilibrium.
9This finding is specific to the simple endowment economy model of this section; subsequent extensions of the model
will find that other no-rebellion constraints become binding. Which composition or compositions of the rebel army
are associated with binding no-rebellion constraints in equilibrium is endogenous and will depend on the situation
being analysed.
12
where Uw and Up are as in equation [3.10], with beliefs p′ and U ′p taken as given. In a Markovian
equilibrium, these beliefs are equal to the corresponding values p∗ and U∗p that solve the maximization
problem.
As can be seen from [3.10], the payoff of each member of the elite is increasing in the tax τ , and
decreasing in the size of the elite p because the total tax revenue must be distributed more widely
(and because there are fewer workers available to tax). The indifference curves of the elite over τ
and p are plotted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Trade-off between elite size and taxation
Taxation (τ)
Elite size (p)0
No rebellion region
“No rebellion” constraint
Elite indifference curves
p∗
τ ∗
An increase in τ reduces the payoffs of workers, making them more willing to fight in a rebellion,
while an increase in the size of the elite boosts the fighting strength of the incumbent army, making
rebellion less attractive to workers. The elite thus has two margins to ensure that it avoids rebellions.
It can reduce taxes τ (the “carrot”), or increase its size p (the “stick”). This corresponds to the
upward-sloping “no-rebellion” constraint depicted in Figure 2.10
After taking into account the binding no-rebellion constraint, the key decision the elite must
make is how widely to share power. It faces a fundamental trade-off in determining its optimal size:
a larger size will strengthen the elite and allow higher taxes to be extracted from workers, but will
also spread the revenue from these taxes more thinly among a larger number of individuals (and
also reduce the tax base). Proposition 1 shows that it is not possible in equilibrium to add extra
individuals to the elite without offering these individuals the same high payoff received by other
members. Thus, sharing power entails sharing rents. The elite then shares power with an extra
individual if and only if this allows it to increase its average payoff. The allocation of power therefore
reflects the interests of the elite, rather than the interests of society. In a Markovian equilibrium,
the utility value of the rents received by those in the elite depends only on the exogenous power
parameter δ.
10When utility is linear in consumption, the no-rebellion constraint is a straight line. The diagram shows the
general case where utility is strictly concave in consumption, resulting in the constraint being a concave function.
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3.6 Example: linear utility in consumption
There are three exogenous parameters in the model: the power parameter δ, the endowment q of
a worker, and the utility function u(·) in consumption. This section illustrates the workings of
the model with a linear utility function u(C) = C. The maximization problem [3.12] of the elite
becomes
max
p,τ
(1− p)τ
p
s.t. C ′p − (q− τ) ≤ δ
p
p′
, [3.13]
after substituting the expressions for Up and Uw from [3.10]. The single no-rebellion constraint is
binding, and can be used to solve explicitly for the tax τ = q − C ′p + δp/p′. By substituting this
level of taxes into the objective function, consumption of the elite is given by
Cp =
1− p
p
(
q− C ′p + δ
p
p′
)
. [3.14a]
The problem is now an unconstrained choice of elite size p to maximize the expression for elite
consumption, with beliefs p′ and C ′p taken as given. The first-order condition is
C∗p
1− p∗ = (1− p
∗)
δ
p′
. [3.14b]
Now the Markovian equilibrium conditions (p∗ = p′, C∗p = C
′
p) are imposed in [3.14a], which leads
to C∗p = (q + δ)(1− p∗). Combining this with equation [3.14b] (and using p∗ = p′ again) yields the
Markovian equilibrium:11
p∗ =
δ
q + 2δ
, C∗p =
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
, and C∗w =
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
− δ. [3.15]
Notice in this case that the size of the elite is a function of the ratio δ/q.12
3.7 Discussion
The model described above is designed to capture in a simple manner the “power struggle” for control
of institutions determining the allocation of resources. Institutions can be overthrown by rebellions
and replaced by new ones. The success of a rebellion is settled by a basic “conflict technology” that
avoids going into the punches and sword thrusts of battle. Everyone has access on the same terms
11The restriction δ/q ≤ ϕ is assumed, where ϕ is the Golden ratio (see footnote 6). When the utility function is
linear, this restriction is necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium in which the non-negativity constraint on workers’
consumption is not binding.
12The power parameter δ affects the equilibrium in three ways. First, an increase in δ makes the elite stronger
because the rebels have to exert greater fighting effort to defeat the incumbent army. This “income effect” leads to
an increase in τ and a decrease in p. Second, the payoff that the rebels would receive once in power increases as
their position will also be stronger once they have supplanted the current elite, making rebellion more attractive.
This offsetting “income effect” decreases τ and increases p. Third, an increase in δ raises the effectiveness of the
marginal fighter in the incumbent army, leading to a “substitution effect” whereby the elite increases its size in order
to extract higher taxes. As long as the non-negativity constraint on workers’ consumption is not binding, the third
effect dominates and the size of the elite is increasing in δ.
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to opportunities for rebellion, irrespective of their current status. Several assumptions are made for
simplicity. The combatants’ strengths are linear in the strengths of the individuals that make up
the rebel and incumbent armies. Members of the incumbent army have a predetermined fighting
strength (the parameter δ), so this is inelastic with respect to current fighting effort. Given fighting
strengths, there is no uncertainty about which side will emerge victorious.
In modelling conflict, it is necessary to introduce some asymmetry between the rebel and incum-
bent armies for the notion of being “in power” to be meaningful. The parameter δ represents the
advantage incumbents derive from their entrenched position. It is fighting strength that is obtained
at no current effort cost, while the rebels can only obtain fighting strength from current effort. The
inelasticity of incumbent-army members’ fighting strength with respect to current effort can be seen
as an inessential simplification.13 When the current elite designs institutions, it has several margins
it can adjust to ensure it avoids rebellions, such as varying the number of individuals in power, or
offering transfers to those who might join a rebel army. The ability to adjust δ at some cost in
addition to these does not fundamentally change the problem. The rebel army, however, lacks these
alternative margins, so it is essential that its fighting strength is responsive to the effort put in by
its members.
One interpretation of the parameter δ is that the individuals currently in power possess some
defensive fortifications, such as a castle, which place them at an immediate fighting advantage over
any rebels who must breach these from outside. A broader interpretation is that δ represents the
more severe coordination problems faced by rebels from outside the current elite. Authority depends
on a chain of command, where individuals follow instructions in expectation of punishment from
others if they disobey. The rebels confront the challenge of persuading enough individuals that they
should fear punishment for disobeying them rather than the incumbents people are accustomed to.14
The assumptions of the model allow for coordination among individuals in launching rebellions,
but subject to some restrictions. These restrictions are intended as a simple representation of the
plausible constraints that ought to be placed on the set of possible deals or “contracts” among
the rebels. The fundamental contracting problem is the issue of enforceability in a world with
no exogenous commitment technologies. The rebellion mechanism is intended to be as flexible as
possible in allowing for “deals” subject to the limits of enforceability.
The rebellion “contract” implicit in the model requires a prescribed amount of fighting effort
from each rebel in return for a position sufficiently high up the pecking order to yield a place in
the new elite. Formally, this deal is represented by the new elite selection function together with
the restriction that the rebel army is limited to those who expect a place in the subsequent elite.
This rebellion contract raises two questions. Why are other forms of contract ruled out? And what
suggests a contract of this form is not susceptible to enforceability concerns?
13The inelasticity assumption can also be viewed as a requirement of internal consistency given the deterministic
nature of the conflict technology. If the incumbents know they will be defeated, it is difficult to rationalize their
exerting any current fighting effort.
14Under this interpretation, the successful rebellion condition in [3.7] can be seen as the rebels’ effort requirement
to demonstrate that they have the strength and the organization to overcome these problems. Once the incumbents
see this tipping point is reached, they surrender and no actual fighting takes place.
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Consider a group of individuals with incentives to come together and agree to fight, enabling
new institutions to be established that offer each of them a better payoff than what they currently
receive. The maximum fighting effort each would be willing to agree to is equal to each’s expected
utility gains. There are two facets of the enforceability problem for this “deal”. First, after the
success of the rebellion, will there be incentives to create the particular institutions that were
agreed beforehand? Second, will individual rebels honour their agreed levels of fighting effort?
A rebellion contract prescribing exactly what institutions are to be set up faces formidable
enforceability problems. Once the current institutions are overthrown, there is no higher authority
(no “meta-institutions”) that can compel the group now in power to act against its interests ex post.
This type of contract is therefore ruled out. The new institutions must maximize elite payoffs15
starting afresh from the world as they now find it, unconstrained by history except for fundamental
state variables.16 Any bygones will be bygones. In particular, this rules out the trigger strategies of
repeated games as commitment devices.17
As Proposition 1 shows, the elite has a strict preference to avoid payoff inequality except where
it is matched by differences in power. It follows that the new elite would have incentives not to
honour contracts that specified either transfers to those who contributed fighting effort during the
rebellion or fines for those who did not, hence such contracts cannot be written ex ante.
Now consider the second aspect of the enforceability problem. Taking as given the payoff im-
provement an individual expects if a rebellion succeeds (subject to the restrictions on what can be
agreed in advance regarding the new institutions), will it be possible to enforce the agreed amount
of fighting effort from an individual who is a party to a rebellion contract? The basic problem is that
each atomistic individual (correctly) does not perceive himself as pivotal in determining whether the
rebellion succeeds. Thus, left to his own devices, he would have an incentive to shirk and free-ride
on others’ fighting effort. To a large extent, rebel armies may be able to control individual mem-
bers through internal discipline, but a non-negligible enforceability problem remains when some
necessary fighting is done at an individual’s discretion.
To ensure that all agreed fighting effort is actually exerted, there needs to be a credible pun-
ishment that can be imposed on shirkers after the fact. However, according to Proposition 1, only
differences in payoffs that reflect differences in power are in the interests of the elite ex post. This
suggests that the offer of a position of power conditional on the requisite amount of fighting effort
can provide a credible incentive not to shirk.18 While the rebellion contract cannot determine the
15In the model, institutions being in the interests of the elite is interpreted to mean maximizing the average elite
payoff. Moving away from this simplifying assumption would require modelling the hierarchy and power relations
within the elite. See Myerson (2008) for a model which addresses that question.
16For simplicity, the occurrence of conflict does not itself affect any fundamental state variables. This implicitly
assumes members of the rebel army can be demobilized costlessly once the fighting is over if, off the equilibrium
path, there were more rebels than places in the new elite. Adding a cost of demobilization would make the size
of the previous rebellion a state variable at the stage new institutions are created, which would add a significant
complication to the model without obviously delivering any new insights.
17Models that allow trigger strategies face the problem of multiple equilibria because there is always a range of
possible punishments consistent with equilibrium.
18Suppose that a fraction ξ of an individual’s agreed fighting effort (associated with some necessary tasks) cannot
be directly enforced at the time through the rebel army’s own discipline mechanisms, but that the full amount of
fighting effort F must be exerted otherwise the individual does not obtain fighting strength F . Suppose also that
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total number of positions of power under the new institutions, it can control the identities of those
who will receive these positions. Formally, this is the elite selection function in the model.19 But
for those who anticipate becoming workers, even if they gain from the success of the rebellion, there
is no worse position they can be credibly assigned if they fail to put in the agreed level of fighting
effort. There is nothing to prevent such individuals from shirking,20 which leads to the restriction
that all rebels must expect a place in the subsequent elite.
4 Public goods
In the model of section 3 there was no scope for the elite to do what governments are customarily
supposed to do, such as provide public goods. This section introduces a technology that allows for
production of public goods. The elite can set up institutions that decree spending on public goods
and make use of tax revenue to pay for this. It is then natural to ask whether resources will be
efficiently allocated to public-good production.
The new technology converts units of output into public goods. If g units of goods per person
are converted then everyone receives an extra Γ(g) units of the consumption good. The function
Γ(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies the usual Inada conditions. The definition
of institutions I from section 3.2 is augmented to specify public-good provision g, hence I =
{P ,W , τ(ı), Cp(ı), g}. All individuals observe the choice of g and take it into account — along with
all other aspects of the institutions — when deciding whether to participate in a rebellion, and if
so, the amount of fighting effort to exert. The model is otherwise identical to that of section 3.
The utility of an individual is now
U = u(C)− F, with C = c+ Γ(g), [4.1]
where C denotes the individual’s overall consumption, comprising private consumption c and the
consumption Γ(g) each person obtains from the public good. Given the overall budget constraint,
each individual’s total fighting effort is verifiable after the rebellion. After agreeing to the rebellion contract, the
individual is directly compelled to exert effort (1 − ξ)F . If he exerts the remaining effort ξF then he receives his
place in the subsequent elite with continuation payoff U ′p. If he shirks and exerts no further effort, he is demoted
to worker status and receives payoff U ′w. Therefore, for individual ı to join the rebel army, incentive compatibility
requires U ′p − U ′w ≥ ξF (ı), while the maximum-effort participation constraint is U ′p − U(ı) ≥ F (ı). If ξ is positive
but sufficiently small then the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied but not binding, while the participation
constraint binds, as was implicitly assumed in the description of the rebellion mechanism.
19The particular elite selection function in place has no effect on the maximum attainable elite payoff, so carrying
out the punishment does not affect the others in the elite. Intuitively, since all individuals are ex ante identical,
individuals in power do not care about the identities of those with whom they share power, only the total number
of such people. Without a device such as an elite selection function, there would be a fundamental indeterminacy
regarding the identities of the elite, which would need to be resolved in some other way.
20The incentive compatibility constraint discussed in footnote 18 would be violated for these individuals with any
positive ξ, no matter how small. One alternative approach that could incentivize more individuals not to shirk
offers a lottery in return for an agreed amount of fighting effort, where the prize is a place in the elite. While this
mechanism could induce fighting effort from more individuals, the amount of effort each individual would agree to is
lower because the lottery is less valuable than a place in the elite with certainty.
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consumption per person is
pCp + (1− p)Cw = (1− p)q− g + Γ(g). [4.2]
A benevolent social planner would choose the first-best level of public-good provision g = gˆ, deter-
mined by Γg(gˆ) = 1, which maximizes the total amount of goods available for consumption.
The payoff-equalization insights of Proposition 1 continue to apply to this new environment,
hence it is possible without loss of generality to focus on institutions specifying the size of the elite
p (with identities determined by an elite selection function), the tax τ levied on all workers, and the
necessarily common public-good provision g. The budget constraint [4.2] can be used to find the
consumption levels of a worker and a member of the elite under a particular set of institutions:
Cw = q− τ + Γ(g), and Cp = (1− p)τ − g
p
+ Γ(g). [4.3]
The argument of Proposition 1 that the equilibrium institutions can be characterized by imposing
only the no-rebellion constraint for a rebel army composed entirely of workers also carries over to
this new environment. Thus, the equilibrium institutions are the solution of
max
p,τ,g
u
(
(1− p)τ − g
p
+ Γ(g)
)
s.t. U ′p − u (q− τ + Γ(g)) ≤ δ
p
p′
, [4.4]
with beliefs p′ and U ′p taken as given, but with p′ = p∗, τ ′ = τ ∗ and g′ = g∗ in equilibrium. Setting
up the Lagrangian for this problem with multiplier χ on the no-rebellion constraint yields first-order
conditions for τ and g:
uC(C
∗
p)
χ∗uC(C∗w)
(
1− p∗
p∗
)
= 1, and
uC(C
∗
p)
χ∗uC(C∗w)
(
1
p∗
− Γg(g∗)
)
= Γg(g
∗). [4.5]
By eliminating the term uC(C
∗
p)/χ
∗uC(C∗w) from the equations above, public-good provision g
∗ under
the equilibrium institutions is determined by Γg(g
∗) = 1. This is identical to the condition for the
provision gˆ by a benevolent social planner, so g∗ = gˆ. The equilibrium institutions are therefore
economically efficient in respect of public-good production.21
To understand this result, observe that the no-rebellion constraint implies the elite cannot dis-
regard the interests of the workers, even though it does not care about them directly. Provision of
the public good slackens the no-rebellion constraint, while the taxes raised to finance it tighten the
constraint. By optimally trading off the benefits of the public good against the cost of production,
the elite effectively maximizes the size of the pie, making use of transfers to ensure everyone is in-
different between rebelling or not. The efficiency result can be seen as a “political” analogue of the
Coase theorem,22 where the contestability of institutions through rebellions plays the role of legal
21The distribution of total output between workers and elite members depends on the other parameters of the
model, including the utility function u(·). In equilibrium, all individuals will receive a higher overall payoff as a result
of the public-good technology becoming available, though in general, the benefits will not be shared equally.
22See Acemoglu (2003) for a discussion of this analogy.
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property rights. The ability of institutions to make transfers between individuals is crucial to this
finding. The institutional technology permits any transfers, but more importantly, the constraints
imposed by the power struggle do not interfere with the transfers needed here.
The analysis shows that although the elite is extracting rents from workers, this does not preclude
it from acting as if it were benevolent in other contexts. Hence, the overall welfare of workers might
be larger or smaller compared to a world in which no-one can compel others to act against their
will. This reflects the ambivalent effects on ordinary people of having a ruling elite.23
The result found in this section is far from surprising and can be obtained in several other
settings, as discussed by Persson and Tabellini (2000) in the context of voting and elections. Here
the result provides a benchmark case where the equilibrium institutions are economically efficient.
5 Investment
This section adds the possibility of investment to the analysis of equilibrium institutions. Individuals
can now exert effort to obtain a greater quantity of goods, but there is a time lag between the effort
being made and the fruits of the investment being received. During this span of time, there are
opportunities for rebellion against the prevailing institutions. The model is otherwise identical to
that of section 3. In particular, there are no changes to the mechanism through which institutions are
created and destroyed. However, if investment occurs then this changes incentives for rebellion, and
thus affects the elite’s design of institutions. The following analysis considers how the equilibrium
institutions will provide incentives for individuals to invest, and to what extent it will be done —
in particular, whether these institutions will achieve economic efficiency.
5.1 Environment
The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 3. Before any investment decisions are made, institutions
are first established through a process identical to that described in section 3 (compare Figure 1).
Institutions can now specify transfers contingent on whether individuals are holding capital (i.e.
taxes on capital), as well as determine the size of the group in power and make other transfers.
Once institutions are established that do not immediately trigger rebellion, there are opportunities
to invest. After investment decisions are made, there is another round of opportunities for rebellion,
with new institutions established if a rebellion occurs. When the prevailing institutions do not lead
to any further rebellions, what those institutions specify is implemented and payoffs are received.
Individuals who are in power (members of the elite, denoted by ı ∈ P) have fighting strength
δ in defence, as in the model of section 3. Economically active individuals (those not in the elite,
denoted by ı ∈ N ) at the post-investment stage receive an endowment of q units of goods.
There are µ investment opportunities. An investment opportunity is the option to produce κ
units of capital in the future in return for incurring a present effort cost θ (in utility units), which is
23This trade-off is mentioned in the Bible (1 Samuel 8:10–20). The people want a king to provide public goods,
despite being warned by the prophet Samuel that the king would use his power in his own interests. Many centuries
later, in far too many cases, the warnings of Samuel remain as relevant as ever.
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Figure 3: Sequence of events with investment
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sunk by the time the capital is produced. Capital here simply means more units of the consumption
good. All investment opportunities yield the same amount of capital κ, but each features an effort
cost that is an independent draw from the distribution
θ ∼ Uniform [ψ, κ] , [5.1]
where 0 < ψ < κ, with ψ being the minimum effort cost.24 An individual’s receipt of an investment
opportunity, the required effort cost θ, and whether the opportunity is taken, are private infor-
mation, while possession of capital is common knowledge.25 It is further assumed that investment
opportunities are received only by those economically active individuals outside the elite,26 and that
investment opportunities are randomly assigned at the investment stage with no-one having prior
knowledge of whether he will receive one, nor the required effort cost θ if so.27
An individual’s utility U is now
U = u(C)− θI − F, [5.2]
where I ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable for whether an investment opportunity is received and
24The uniform distribution is chosen for simplicity. The choice of distribution does not affect the qualitative results.
25Since investment opportunities are private information when taken, it is not feasible to have institutions specifying
a “command economy” where individuals perform investments by decree, nor is it feasible to make holding power
contingent on receiving and taking an investment opportunity.
26Allowing the elite to invest adds extra complications to the model. It might be thought important to have
investors inside the elite to provide appropriate incentives. As will be seen, this is not the case, and moreover, the
advantage of having investors inside the elite most likely applies to the case where they are brought into the elite
before they decide whether to take investment opportunities. Given the information restrictions, which represent the
not implausible difficulties of identifying talented investors in advance, bringing them in at that stage is not feasible.
27This modelling device places individuals behind a “veil of ignorance” about their talents as investors when
the pre-investment stage institutions are determined. Doing this avoids having to track whether talented investors
are disproportionately inside or outside the elite, which would add a (relevant) state variable to the problem of
determining the pre-investment stage institutions, significantly complicating the analysis. However, it will turn out
that the no-rebellion constraints are slack at the pre-investment stage, so this assumption need not significantly affect
the results.
20
taken, and F denotes any fighting effort, as in the model of section 3.
The following parameter restrictions are imposed:
δ
q
≤ ϕ ≡ 1 +
√
5
2
, µ ≤ q
2(q + 2δ)
, κ < δ, and u(C) = C. [5.3]
The first restriction is the bound from section 3.6 needed to ensure non-negativity constraints
are always slack in equilibrium. The second restriction states that the measure µ of individuals
who receive an investment opportunity is not too large, which ensures that capitalists are not the
predominant group by numbers.28 The third restriction places a physical limit on the economy’s
maximum capital stock. Finally, individuals’ preferences are assumed to be linear in consumption
for analytical tractability. This allows for a simple closed-form solution, but it is expected that
similar results would be found for the general class of concave utility functions.
5.2 Equilibrium institutions
Characterizing the equilibrium institutions requires working backwards, determining the new equi-
librium institutions if a rebellion were to occur at the post-investment stage, and then analysing
what institutions will be chosen at the pre-investment stage. The elite at the pre-investment stage
will want to choose institutions that survive rebellion at all points.
5.2.1 Post-investment stage institutions after a rebellion
Suppose a rebellion occurs at some point after investment decisions have been made. Let K(ı)
denote the capital currently held by individual ı. The effort cost θ of investing is now sunk, so
the continuation value of utility U = C − F is the same for both an expropriated capitalist and an
individual who never possessed any capital to begin with. Since holdings of capital are common
knowledge, an argument similar to Proposition 1 shows that the institutions chosen by the elite
in the unique Markovian equilibrium would equalize continuation payoffs for economically active
individuals outside the elite (ı ∈ N ). This means that any notional claims to capital will be set
aside and individuals’ payoffs will be determined according to their power, with capital redistributed
accordingly under a new set of institutional rules.
Let τq denote the net tax paid by an economically active individual (one receiving the endowment
q) independent of the individual’s holdings of capital, and τκ(ı) the tax on capital paid by individual
ı. For a general distribution of capital, payoff equalization requires τκ(ı) = K(ı), that is, a 100%
tax on capital. The budget constraint faced by the elite is then
pCp = (1− p)τq +
∫
Ω
τκ(ı)dı = (1− p)τq +K, with K =
∫
Ω
K(ı)dı,
28If capitalists were to become the predominant group then the nature of the binding constraints might change and
the problem would become significantly more algebraically convoluted. While this analysis could in principle add
some twists to the results, it would not affect any of the conclusions in this paper, so it is left for future research.
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where K denotes the total capital stock, and Cp is the consumption of each member of the elite (the
equilibrium features payoff equalization among the elite, using the argument of Proposition 1). Given
the consumption Cn the 1− p economically active individuals outside the elite, the consumption Cp
of the p elite members can be found using the budget constraint. The levels of utility are:
Un = Cn = (q− τq) + (K(ı)− τκ(ı)) = q− τq, and Up = Cp = (1− p)(q− Un) +K
p
. [5.4]
Using the argument of Proposition 1, the institutions in the Markovian equilibrium following a
rebellion at the post-investment stage can be characterized by maximizing the elite payoff in [5.4]
subject to a single no-rebellion constraint
Un ≤ U ′p(K)− δ
p
p′(K)
,
where p′(K) and U ′p(K) are the beliefs about the subsequent institutions following a further rebel-
lion.29 In a Markovian equilibrium, these beliefs may be functions of the total capital stock K,
which is a relevant state variable here (the model of section 3 featured no relevant state variables).
Given payoff equalization, the choice variables are the lump-sum tax τq and the elite size p (with
identities of the elite determined by the elite selection function given the elite size p).
Solving this constrained maximization problem and then imposing the Markovian equilibrium
conditions p(K) = p′(K) and Up(K) = U ′p(K) leads to a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium values
of each variable are as follows, denoted by a † superscript:
p† =
δ
q + 2δ
, U †p(K) =
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
+K, and U †w(K) =
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
− δ+K. [5.5]
The equilibrium elite size p† is independent of K and is the same as that found in the endowment
economy model with linear utility from section 3.6.30 The results show that were a rebellion to occur
at the post-investment stage, the entire capital stock would be expropriated and equally distributed
among the whole population. The elite chooses to redistribute the capital among all individuals
because the presence of the capital increases incentives for further rebellions.
5.2.2 Pre-investment stage institutions
Institutions chosen at the pre-investment stage specify the set of individuals in power, denoted by
P , and the set of economically active individuals outside the elite, denoted by N . Depending on the
institutions and the arrival of investment opportunities, some of the individuals in N may become
investors, denoted by I. Those economically active individuals who do not become investors are
referred to as workers, denoted by W .
It is shown formally in Proposition 2 below that the elite’s payoff is strictly lower when there
29Under the parameter restrictions in [5.3], all non-negativity constraints on consumption are slack, the constraint
p < 1/2 is slack, and the participation constraint U†p(K) > U†w(K) for the incumbent army is slack.
30This analytically convenient finding is owing to the linearity of utility in consumption.
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is inequality in payoffs among workers or among members of the elite (but differences in power
justify inequality between these groups). Moreover, there is no loss of generality in considering
institutions that give all investors the same level of consumption.31 It follows that attention can be
restricted to institutions specifying a constant tax τκ on those holding capital, a constant tax τq on
all economically active individuals (workers and investors), and an elite size p.32
In equilibrium, institutions will survive rebellion at all points, so the incentive to take an in-
vestment opportunity is assessed under the hypothesis that the capital tax τκ and all other rules
specified by the current institutions will be implemented. If an investment opportunity is not re-
ceived or is not taken then an individual becomes a worker. Any economically active individual ı
holding capital K(ı) = κ also receives the endowment q, but now pays total tax τq + τκ. Thus, all
investors have consumption Ci = q + κ− τq − τκ. The utilities of a worker (ı ∈ W) and an investor
(ı ∈ I) who takes an opportunity with effort cost θ are:
Uw = Cw = q− τq, and Ui(θ) = Ci − θ = (q− τq) + (κ− τκ)− θ. [5.6]
An individual with an investment opportunity takes it if Ui(θ) ≥ Uw, which is equivalent to the effort
cost θ being not more than a threshold θ˜, where Ui(θ˜) = Uw. The proportion of those receiving an
investment opportunity who take it is denoted by s, which is calculated given θ˜ using the uniform
distribution for θ specified in [5.1]. Expressions for these variables and the total measure i of
investors and the total capital stock K are:
θ˜ = κ− τκ, s = Pθ[θ ≤ θ˜] = θ˜−ψ
κ−ψ , i = µs, and K = iκ. [5.7]
The elite aims to design institutions that survive opportunities for rebellion both before and after
investment decisions are made. Potential rebellions at these stages need to be considered separately
owing to the change in the environment as a result of the presence of capital and the revelation of
information after the investment stage.
At the post-investment stage, there are three groups of individuals: workers (W), those in power
(P), and investors (I) who have already incurred a sunk effort cost, and who are now referred to as
capitalists. Workers receive the payoff Uw given in equation [5.6]. All capitalists receive the same
level of consumption Ci and so have the same continuation payoff Uk. The budget constraint can
then be used to find the consumption of those in the elite. The utilities of capitalists and elite
31The arguments relating to the distribution of consumption among investors are different from those for workers
or elite members. As will be seen, providing incentives to investors implies that their continuation payoffs at the
post-investment stage must be higher than those of workers. Since these individuals have identical power (investors
are outside the elite), investors will not be included in the rebel army with the greatest fighting strength. As a result,
when the utility function u(·) is linear, there is no equivalent result stating that ex-post inequality among investors’
payoffs reduces the payoff of the elite. However, given that capital κ is common to all investors and the effort cost
θ is private information, there is no loss of utility to the elite from choosing a constant capital tax τκ to be paid by
all investors, nor indeed would this restriction have consequences for any aggregate variables. Given linearity of u(·),
institutions specifying lotteries of capital taxes for investors could also maximize the elite’s payoff if the dispersion
of taxes were sufficiently small, but this would not change any of the results regarding the aggregate amount of
investment in equilibrium.
32The identities of the individuals in the elite are determined by the elite selection function given the elite size p.
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members are:
Uk = Ci = (q− τq) + (κ− τκ), and Up = Cp = (1− p)τq + iτκ
p
. [5.8]
In principle, rebel armies could comprise any of these groups of individuals, or any mixture of them.
At the pre-investment stage, there are only two groups of distinct individuals: those in power
(P), and those economically active individuals (N ) outside the elite (who do not know yet whether
they will become workers or investors). Let Un denote the expected utility of an economically active
individual under the current institutions. If α denotes the probability that such an individual will
receive an investment opportunity, his expected payoff is given by:33
Un = (1− α)Uw + αEθ max{Ui(θ),Uw}, where α = µ
1− p. [5.9]
This payoff can be written in terms of the expected surplus Si(θ˜) of those receiving an investment
opportunity:
Un = (q− τq) + αSi(θ˜), where Si(θ˜) ≡ Eθ max{θ˜− θ, 0}. [5.10]
Incentives to rebel depend on what payoffs the rebels expect to receive under the post-rebellion
institutions. For a rebellion at the post-investment stage, the unique Markovian equilibrium insti-
tutions that would be set up after the rebellion have already been characterized as a function of
the aggregate capital stock K. The subsequent elite would be of size p† and receive utility U †p(K)
as given in equation [5.5], with the capital stock K predetermined according to [5.7]. At the pre-
investment stage, there will be beliefs p′ and U ′p about what elite size and elite payoff would prevail
under the institutions formed after a rebellion at that stage. These beliefs will be determined using
the restriction to Markovian choices of institutions.
The problem of choosing institutions is thus
max
p,τq,τκ
Up s.t. σn max{U ′p − Un, 0}+ σp(U ′p − Up + δ)1[U ′p ≥ Up] ≤ δ
p
p′
and [5.11]
σ†w max{U †p(K)− Un, 0}+ σ†p(U †p(K)− Up + δ)1[U †p(K) ≥ Up] + σ†i max{U †p(K)− Uk, 0} ≤ δ
p
p†
,
for all possible σn, σp, σ
†
w, σ
†
p, and σ
†
i , where these coefficients indicate, respectively, the proportions
of economically active and elite members in a pre-investment stage rebel army, and the proportions
of workers, elite members, and investors in a post-investment stage rebel army. These non-negative
coefficients must satisfy the natural restrictions σn ≤ (1−p)/p′, σp ≤ p/p′, and σn +σp = 1, together
with σ†w ≤ w/p†, σ†p ≤ p/p†, σ†i ≤ i/p†, and σ†w + σ†p + σ†i = 1.
The following result confirms the payoff-equalization claims made earlier and characterizes which
of the many possible no-rebellion constraints are binding in equilibrium.34
33Note that the parameter restrictions in [5.3] imply µ < 1/2, and since p < 1/2, the number of economically active
individuals is always more than 50%, and hence more than the number of investment opportunities. This justifies
the formula for i in [5.7] and the formula for α in [5.9].
34It is verified later that the non-negativity constraint Cw ≥ 0, the constraint p < 1/2, and the participation
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Proposition 2 Consider an arbitrary choice of the capital tax τκ, which determines θ˜ and s ac-
cording to [5.7]. Any Markovian equilibrium with s > 0 must have the following features:
(i) Payoff equalization among all workers, and payoff equalization among all elite members.
(ii) All no-rebellion constraints at the pre-investment stage are slack. Two no-rebellion constraints
at the post-investment stage are binding, namely (σ†w, σ
†
p, σ
†
i ) = (1, 0, 0) and (σ
†
w, σ
†
p, σ
†
i ) =
(0, 1, 0) (as well as any constraints where σ†w + σ
†
p = 1, which are satisfied as a consequence of
those two).
(iii) The binding no-rebellion constraints imply that
p = p† +
µθ˜s
δ
, [5.12a]
so incentives for investment require a larger elite size p at the pre-investment stage than the
size p† that would be optimal at the post-investment stage.
(iv) Given the elite size from [5.12a], the payoff of a member of the elite is
Up = (q + δ)
2
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜
)
s. [5.12b]
Proof See appendix A.2. 
The proposition shows that no investor belongs to a rebel army associated with a binding no-
rebellion constraint. The basic reason is that providing incentives to investors means granting
them higher consumption than workers, and thus higher utility ex post once the sunk effort cost
of investing has already been incurred (ex ante, the marginal investor has the same utility as a
worker). This can be seen by combining equations [5.6], [5.7] and [5.8] to obtain Uk = Uw + θ˜, where
θ˜ > 0 when s > 0. The analysis of section 5.2.1 shows that the institutions following a rebellion
at the post-investment stage will not respect individual holdings of capital prior to the rebellion.
Thus, what investors stand to receive following a rebellion (net of fighting costs) is no different from
that of workers who rebel (their power is identical), while what they lose is superior. Accordingly,
they are less willing to fight to replace the current institutions. This implies the distribution of
income needed to provide incentives to invest is not one that investors themselves could enforce by
a credible threat to participate in rebellions.
The fundamental problem is that the distribution of income needed to encourage investment
diverges from that consistent with the distribution of power, and so there are incentives for groups
to rebel against institutions prescribing property rights. As usual, the no-rebellion constraint is
binding for workers since the elite gains by extracting as much as possible from them. What is novel
here is that discouraging rebellion by workers is no longer sufficient in the presence of investment
opportunities: the elite must also worry about rebellion from within its own ranks. The elite would
constraints Up > U ′w and Up > U†w(K) for the incumbent army are all slack.
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like to design institutions encouraging investment by not taxing capital too heavily, but there is also
the temptation ex post for elite members to participate in a rebellion that will allow them to create
new institutions permitting full expropriation of capital. The fact that the effort cost of investment
is sunk gives rise to a time-inconsistency problem, which is reflected in the threat of rebellion coming
from inside as well as outside the elite.35
Given this time-inconsistency problem, it might be thought impossible to sustain any investment
in equilibrium because individuals cannot commit not to rebel. Since the defence of the current
institutions relies on those in power, a rebellion backed by all members of the elite succeeds without
requiring any fighting effort. If the elite size p were equal to p†, those in power would be able to
destroy the current institutions through a costless “suspension of the constitution”, allowing new
institutions to be created while leaving the current elite members in power, essentially granting them
full discretion ex post to rewrite the rules completely. However, if p > p†, costless suspension of the
constitution is not possible. The equilibrium elite size after the rebellion is smaller than beforehand,
so some members of the existing elite must lose their positions. The rebellion launched by insiders
is now necessarily a “coup d’e´tat” that shrinks the elite. Conflict with those elite members who lose
their positions makes this a costly course of action.
The formal analysis in Proposition 2 confirms that satisfaction of the no-rebellion constraints for
workers and elite members is equivalent to ensuring the pre-investment elite size p is large in relation
to p†, the equilibrium elite size after a rebellion at the post-investment stage. As the proportion s
of investors rises, the required elite size p increases. The choice of capital tax τκ (which determines
s via equation [5.7]) can be interpreted broadly as revealing the extent of protection of private
property against expropriation (whether directly, or indirectly through taxes). The elite size p can
be interpreted as how widely members of the elite choose to share power. The claim in [5.12a] is
that credible limits on expropriation require more power sharing than what would be optimal for
an elite member after investment decisions have actually been made.
The proposition shows that not only is this increase in power sharing sufficient for credible
protection of property rights; it is also necessary. There is no other design of institutions that
can both establish credible incentives for investors and survive the power struggle. In particular,
it might be thought possible to solve the problem through some system of taxes and transfers.
But discouraging rebellion by workers would require lower taxes, while discouraging rebellion by
members of the elite would require higher taxes. Further taxes on investors would of course destroy
the very incentives that must be preserved. The only way to discourage rebellion from both inside
and outside the elite simultaneously is an increase in the elite size. Fundamentally, transfers are a
zero-sum game, and can only redistribute disgruntlement with the current institutions.36
Sharing power among a wider group of individuals therefore allows the elite to act as a government
committed to policies that would otherwise be time inconsistent. Even though all individuals act
35The no-rebellion constraint for the elite places a lower bound on the elite payoff Up even though the institutions
are set up to maximize Up ex ante. The constraint then represents the absence of incentives to deviate from the
initial institutions through rebellion ex post.
36On the other hand, the notion of being in power is essentially an ability to impose costs on others when fighting
occurs at a lower cost to oneself.
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with discretion, overcoming the time-inconsistency problem is feasible. Sharing power thus emerges
endogenously as a commitment device. It provides a solution to the classic problem of “who will
guard the guardians?”: institutions can be protected from those who hold power when some of them
fear losing their privileged status if the institutions are destroyed from within.37
This analysis rests on two key assumptions made earlier about institutions and the power strug-
gle. First, institutions do lay down the allocation of resources and power that is respected unless
they are overthrown by a rebellion. For institutions to function in supporting cooperation among
individuals who have chosen to stop fighting, it is essential that particular individuals or groups
cannot arbitrarily modify aspects of those institutions while managing at the same time to avoid
calling into question the whole structure. This assumption is necessary for the sheer existence of
an environment where rules are followed. It captures the idea that elites can in principle create
institutions that specify known taxes to which individuals acquiesce when they decide not to rebel.
Second, there is no means of enforcing commitments made at the time of rebellion to take actions
that are not optimal after the rebellion has succeeded. The underlying idea is that institutions can
implicitly support deals between individuals, but there are no “meta-institutions” to enforce deals
concerning the choice of institutions themselves. This means that following the destruction of a
set of institutions, there must be optimization over all possible dimensions of the new institutions.
In particular, following a rebellion after investment decisions have been made, the degree of power
sharing is reoptimized in addition to the tax system.
Once individuals have incurred the sunk effort costs of investing, those in power would like to be
able to sign a “rebellion contract” where they agree to overthrow the institutions and expropriate
capital, but bind themselves not to change the number of positions of power. However, each has
an incentive to reduce the extent of power sharing (imposing the loss of status on others within
the former elite), so this contract could only be enforced by some exogenous higher authority. In
the absence of such a thing, those in power may rebel against the existing institutions, but cannot
commit to what they will then do next.38
5.3 The equilibrium and efficient choices of capital taxation
Economic development ultimately requires rewarding the productive rather than just the strong,
and for this to happen, institutions must credibly protect the property rights of investors. It is an
endogenous feature of the model that institutions with broader power sharing can achieve that goal,
but does the elite have an incentive to build institutions conducive to investment?
Given payoff equalization within groups, the elite chooses three institutional variables: p, τq and
τκ. Proposition 2 identifies two binding no-rebellion constraints at the post-investment stage, which
37The extra members of the elite are in no way intrinsically different from existing members and do not have access
to any special technology directly protecting property rights.
38If it were possible for the rebels to commit to restrict reoptimization to certain areas following a rebellion,
paradoxically this makes it harder for institutions to sustain credible commitments. For example, suppose the
composition of the elite is defined on the first page of the constitution, and limits on expropriation of private property
are specified on the second page. If it were feasible somehow to prevent a successful rebellion from rewriting page
one of the constitution then this would annihilate the credibility of page two.
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can be used to eliminate two of these variables. The proposition also shows that no pre-investment-
stage constraints are binding: groups would always have an incentive to defer rebellion until after
investments have been made. This leaves one degree of freedom to maximize the elite payoff Up.
Equation [5.12b] gives an expression for Up as a function of s and θ˜, with p and τq eliminated using
the binding constraints. Noting the relationship between θ˜ and s from [5.7], the expression in [5.12b]
can be differentiated to obtain the equilibrium value of s∗:
s∗ = max
{
0,
δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
2(q + 2δ)(κ−ψ)
}
. [5.13]
As confirmed below in Proposition 3, this is the unique Markovian equilibrium of the model. Does
it correspond to the efficient level of investment?
Since θ lies in the range [ψ, κ], it is easy to see from [5.10] that the surplus Si(θ˜) from investment
opportunities is maximized when ˆ˜θ = κ. This is the first-best level of investment. From [5.7] it
follows that τˆκ = 0 and sˆ = 1, so capital taxes should be zero. From a public finance perspective, in
a world where the government needs to raise a particular amount of revenue, this is also the capital
tax that would be chosen optimally because lump-sum taxes and transfers are available. Equation
[5.13] clearly shows that s∗ < 1, and hence τ ∗κ > 0, so equilibrium investment always falls short of
the first-best level as capital taxes are positive.
However, the first best is not the most interesting welfare benchmark. The model demonstrates
power sharing is required for protection of property rights, but a larger elite diverts more individuals
from directly productive occupations (individuals in the elite do not receive the endowment q). This
means there is an opportunity cost of increasing the elite size. Does the finding that s∗ < 1 then
simply reflect the resource cost of adding more individuals to the elite, compared to the hypothetical
first-best world where there is no need to provide credible incentives?
To address this question, consider the following notion of constrained efficiency. Suppose that
it were possible exogenously to impose some choice of capital tax τκ on the institutions selected by
any elite at the pre-investment stage. All other aspects of institutions would be chosen as before
by elites to maximize their own payoffs subject to avoiding rebellions. The constrained efficient
level of the capital tax is what would then be chosen by a benevolent agent who takes into account
the other institutional choices made by elites to survive the power struggle. The benevolent agent
would appreciate that more investment requires greater protection of property rights, and thus more
power sharing. The concept of constrained efficiency requires setting the benefit of more investment
against the resource cost of the larger elite.39 In the public-good application considered in section 4,
a benevolent agent could not improve upon the efficiency of the institutions by imposing a level of
public-good provision different from what prevails in equilibrium. Here, the issue is whether the
equilibrium amount of investment coincides with its constrained efficient level.
The benevolent agent maximizes the average ex ante utility U¯ of all individuals. All institutional
39If there were no resource cost of increasing the size of the elite then the notion of constrained efficiency would
coincide with first best. Note that in the model with the public-good technology from section 4, the first-best and
constrained efficient outcomes are the same.
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variables other than τκ are determined in equilibrium as before, and notice that the claims in
Proposition 2 regarding payoff equalization and which constraints will bind continue to hold even
with the value of s corresponding to the benevolent agent’s choice of τκ. The elite size p and
proportion s of individuals accepting investment opportunities determine the number of investors
i = µs (all of whom have θ ≤ θ˜) and the number of workers w = 1− p− i. Writing average utility
U¯ in terms of the payoffs of each of these groups:
U¯ ≡
∫
Ω
U(ı)dı = pUp + (1− p− µs)Uw + µsEθ[Ui(θ)|θ ≤ θ˜]. [5.14]
The condition Ui(θ˜) = Uw holds for the marginal investor with effort cost θ˜. Average utility can
then be rewritten in terms of the investors’ surplus Si(θ˜) from [5.10]:
U¯ = pUp + (1− p)Uw + µSi(θ˜).
Proposition 2 implies that the only two binding no-rebellion constraints are for workers and members
of the elite at the post-investment stage. As a consequence, it can be seen from [5.11] that worker
and elite payoffs are tied together by Uw = Up−δ. Since the benevolent agent takes such constraints
into account, this relationship is substituted into the expression for U¯ :
U¯ = Up − δ(1− p) + µSi(θ˜). [5.15]
There are thus two differences between the expressions for average utility U¯ and the elite’s objective
Up. The second term on the right-hand side is related to the distribution of resources between
different individuals, and the third term reflects the investors’ surplus.
Proposition 3 (i) The unique Markovian equilibrium s∗ is given by the expression in [5.13].
(ii) The constrained efficient value of s (denoted by s) that maximizes U¯ in [5.15] is given by the
following expression (if the non-negativity constraint on workers’ consumption does not bind):
s = max
{
0,
δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(2q + δ)(κ−ψ)
}
. [5.16]
(iii) s∗ is positive when κ/ψ− 1 > 1 + q/δ, while κ/ψ− 1 > q/δ is necessary for s > 0. Whenever
s > 0, it must be the case that s∗ < s.
Proof See appendix A.3. 
There are two reasons why the constrained-efficient choice of capital taxes is lower — and thus
associated with more investment — than what prevails in equilibrium. The first (and more interest-
ing) distortion follows from the distributional consequences of protection against expropriation (the
second term in equation [5.15]). Strong property rights require sharing power, which in turn requires
sharing rents because members of the elite are more powerful than other individuals. Those in the
elite can implement the constrained-efficient allocation, which requires a larger p, but the need to
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avoid rebellions implies that they would have to offer rents to the extra elite members. Therefore,
the cost to elite members of expanding their number is not simply the lost output from diverting
individuals away from directly productive activities.
In contrast to the environment in section 4, the power struggle imposes an endogenous and
binding constraint on the set of possible transfers among individuals. This leads to a breakdown
of the political analogue of the Coase theorem. A larger elite gives rise to the conditions necessary
for individuals to undertake investment projects that increase output, but the association between
power and rents places a lower bound on the consumption of each elite member. The impossibility
of sharing power without sharing rents thus drives a wedge between maximizing total output and
maximizing the elite’s own payoff.
The second distortion is that the equilibrium choice of capital taxes does not take account of
investors’ surplus (the third term in equation [5.15]). Since investors’ effort costs θ are not public
information, it is impossible for the elite to make transfers conditional on this information. The no-
rebellion constraints for rebel armies including such individuals will be slack, so no benefit accrues
to the elite from marginal increases in investors’ payoffs. This increases the wedge between total
output and the elite’s payoff.40
The inefficiently high capital taxes can be interpreted as inadequate protection against govern-
ment expropriation of private property. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) present evidence
that institutional failures in this area are especially damaging to economic performance. But why
should property rights be so susceptible to political failures compared to other aspects of institu-
tions? The model here sheds light on this question.41
5.4 Historical analogies
The results highlight the importance of sharing power in enabling governments to overcome time-
inconsistency problems, for example, creating an environment in which individuals can make in-
vestments without fearing expropriation of a large portion of their return. The results also show
that rulers will not share power as much as would be desirable for economic efficiency. Although
the model is too abstract to match any given historical episode precisely, these conclusions resonate
with a number of examples.
Broadly speaking, the extra individuals in power required to sustain property rights (in the
model, the difference between p∗ and p†, as given in Proposition 2) might be interpreted as a “par-
liament” or any other group of people with the power to resist attempts to change institutions
coming especially from others in power. Members of parliaments are usually thought of as repre-
40The first and second distortions correspond respectively to the second and third terms in the expression for U¯ in
[5.15]. The effect of each of them on first-order condition determining s∗ is thus seen to be independent of the other
distortion.
41The welfare implications of the parameter δ are non-trivial in this application of the model. In the public-good
application of section 4, a larger δ can only be harmful to workers because it allows higher taxes to be sustained,
resulting in a more unequal distribution of income. In contrast, in an economy with a very small value of δ, there
would not be any investment in equilibrium. A larger δ parameter makes it easier for the elite to remain in power,
which directly benefits elite members, but might also allow them to offer some protection of property rights.
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senting those who elect them, but so are democratically elected presidents, and the rationale for
parliaments with large numbers of members must go beyond simply defending minorities. Power
sharing makes institutions more stable because it makes it costlier for some members of the elite to
replace the current institutions with new ones — with potentially different rules on how resources
and power are distributed. Once power is too concentrated, institutions become subject to the
whims of those in power, as noted by Montesquieu.
In seventeenth-century England, the Glorious Revolution led to power sharing between king and
parliament. By accepting the Bill of Rights, King William III conceded that power would be shared.
North and Weingast (1989) argue that the Glorious Revolution began an era of secure property rights
and put an end to confiscatory government. As a result, the English government was able to borrow
much more, and at substantially lower rates. This was certainly in the interests of the king, yet the
earlier Stuart kings had staunchly resisted sharing power with parliament. According to the model,
secure property rights require just such power sharing to make it costly for the king to rewrite the
rules ex post. However, the existence of a parliament with real power implies that rents have to be
shared, so even if the total pie becomes larger, with a smaller share, the amount received by the
king might end up being lower.
Malmendier (2009) studies the Roman societas publicanorum, which were groups (precursors
of the modern business corporation) to which the government contracted functions such as tax
collection and public works. Their demise occurred with the transition from the Roman republic
to the Roman empire. Why? According to Malmendier (2009), one possible explanation is that
“the Roman Republic was a system of checks and balances. But the emperors centralized power
and could, in principle, bend law and enforcement in their favor”. In other words, while power
was decentralized, it was possible to have rules that guaranteed the government’s contract with
the societas publicanorum and their property rights, presumably because changing the rules would
result in some of the individuals in power coming into conflict with their peers, which would be
costly. Once power was centralized, protection against expropriation was not possible any longer.
6 Concluding remarks
Research in economics has frequently progressed by focusing on the behaviour of individuals subject
to some fundamental constraints or frictions and deriving the resulting implications for the economy.
For example, it is often claimed that unemployment, credit rationing, and missing markets ought not
to be directly assumed, but instead derived from the likes of search frictions, limited pledgeability,
or asymmetric information.
This is arguably a far cry from the state of the art in research on social conflict and institutions.
This literature typically assumes the existence of exogenous groups, imposes ad-hoc limits on what
those in and out of power can do, on what happens when another group takes power, and makes a
variety of different assumptions for the many dimensions of the power struggle. Furthermore, the
workings of political institutions such as courts, constitutions, and representative bodies are often
exogenously assumed. While many of these assumptions might be matched by their counterparts
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in reality, one is left to wonder how different the implications would be of a model where those
features were not imposed, but emerged endogenously as a result of some more elementary frictions.
Moreover, one consequence of the existing approach is that assumptions end up being very specific
to the particular problem being analysed. A unified framework that can be used for analysis of
different questions related to institutions is lacking — which is not surprising once we start to think
about the challenge of integrating social conflict, governance, and individual choice into an economic
model. Yet we believe that building such a framework could yield substantial gains in understanding
institutions and their economic consequences.
The model of this paper attempts a step in that direction. Institutions are assumed to maximize
the payoffs of those in power subject only to the power struggle, with no arbitrary constraints on
transfers or policies. The power struggle is captured by a single rebellion mechanism that allows
individuals to form groups and fight for power. Those in power have an advantage in defending the
current institutions, but the option of rebelling is open to everyone on the same terms.
Our goal is to understand what features of political institutions arise in equilibrium starting from
the basics of preferences, technologies, and the power struggle. In this paper, the general framework
was used to study a situation where investment is possible but can be expropriated. We do not
assume that property rights can be protected through some explicit and exogenous institutional
technology. Instead, we derive the means by which this can be done endogenously starting from the
primitives of the environment, and ask whether such protection will be efficiently provided by the
equilibrium institutions. In order to generate commitment to rules that would otherwise be time
inconsistent, a larger elite is endogenously formed. But the same conflict mechanism that explains
how power sharing can overcome the commitment problem also implies that sharing power cannot
be done without sharing rents. This imposes endogenous limits on the set of possible transfers
and precludes Pareto-improving deals. In equilibrium, there is too little power sharing, and thus
not enough institutional stability to offer investors the strong property rights required for economic
efficiency.
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A Technical appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a set of institutions I = {P,W, τ(ı), Cp(ı)} that constitute a Markovian equilibrium. Let U¯w
and U¯p denote the average payoffs of workers and elite members under these institutions:
U¯w ≡ 1|W|
∫
W
Uw(ı)dı, and U¯p ≡ 1|P|
∫
P
Up(ı)dı. [A.1.1]
To be an equilibrium, the institutions must maximize U¯p subject to the general no-rebellion constraint
[3.7]. Using the equations [3.5] and [3.6] that define the rebel and incumbent armies for a particular new
elite selection function E ′(·), the general no-rebellion constraint can be stated as follows:∫
W∩E ′(p′)
max{U ′p − Uw(ı), 0}dı+
∫
P∩E ′(p′)
max{U ′p − Up(ı), 0}dı
≤
∫
P∩E ′(p′)
δ1[Up(ı) > U ′p]dı+
∫
P\E ′(p′)
δ1[Up(ı) > U ′w]dı for all E ′(·).
[A.1.2]
To be a Markovian equilibrium, the institutions must also satisfy the conditions p = p′, U¯p = U ′p, and
U¯w = U ′w.
Notice that if Uw(ı) > U ′p for a positive measure of workers ı ∈ W then taxes τ(ı) on those workers can
be raised without increasing their fighting effort max{U ′p−Uw(ı), 0}. If the extra tax revenue is distributed
among the elite then U¯p is strictly increased, while no Up(ı) is lower. It follows that if [A.1.2] was initially
satisfied then it continues to be so after this deviation. Since this deviation is both feasible and raises
the elite’s objective function, the original institutions featuring Uw(ı) > U ′p cannot be an equilibrium.
Therefore, attention can be restricted to institutions satisfying Uw(ı) ≤ U ′p for all ı ∈ W. This implies
U¯w ≤ U ′p, so all Markovian equilibria must be such that U¯w ≤ U¯p.
Next, consider the case where Up(ı) < U ′w for a positive measure of elite members ı ∈ P. Since this
implies Up(ı) < U¯p in a Markovian equilibrium, expulsion of these individuals from the elite (and shrinking
the elite size so they are not replaced) would strictly increase U¯p. Assume that an alternative set of
institutions grant these expelled individuals the same consumption as when they were elite members. Since
those outside the elite receive the endowment q, there are also extra resources to distribute, and assume
these are distributed among elite members. This means that Up(ı) is no lower for anyone who remains
within the elite under these alternative institutions. Consequently, the left-hand side of [A.1.2] is no higher
for any E ′(·), and since the expelled individuals had Up(ı) < U ′w ≤ U ′p, the right-hand side of [A.1.2] is
unaffected for all E ′(·). The deviation raising U¯p is therefore feasible, which shows that all Markovian
equilibria must be such that Up(ı) ≥ U ′w for all ı ∈ P.
Restricting attention to cases where Uw(ı) ≤ U ′p and Up(ı) ≥ U ′w for all ı, the general no-rebellion
constraint [A.1.2] is equivalent to∫
W∩E ′(p′)
(U ′p − Uw(ı))dı+
∫
P∩E ′(p′)
1[Up(ı) ≤ U ′p](U ′p − Up(ı) + δ)dı ≤ δp for all E ′(·), [A.1.3]
where p = |P| is the measure of the set P of individuals in power. Given a particular new elite selection
function E ′(·), the subset of workers offered a place in the new elite is Ew = W ∩ E ′(p′), and the subset
of current elite members who receive a place in the subsequent elite is Ep = P ∩ E ′(p′). Conversely, for
any sets Ew ⊆ W and Ep ⊆ P such that |Ew ∪ Ep| = p′, there exists a new elite selection function E ′(·)
generating these sets. Therefore, the general no-rebellion constraint [A.1.3] can be stated equivalently as∫
Ew
(U ′p − Uw(ı))dı+
∫
Ep
1[Up(ı) ≤ U ′p](U ′p − Up(ı) + δ) ≤ δp for all Ew ⊆ W, Ep ⊆ P with |Ew ∪ Ep| = p′.
[A.1.4]
In what follows, let σ denote the fraction of places in the post-rebellion elite that would be filled by
35
those who are workers under the current institutions. With this definition, note that σ = |Ew|/p′ and
1− σ = |Ep|/p′. Given p and p′, and hence |W| = 1− p, there are limits on the range of possible σ values
associated with sets Ew ⊆ W, Ep ⊆ P with |Ew ∪ Ep| = p′. In particular, σ must lie between σ and σ:
σ ≡ max
{
0,
p′ − p
p′
}
, and σ ≡ min
{
1− p
p′
, 1
}
. [A.1.5]
Now define the following functions Fw(σ) and Fp(σ) of σ ∈ [σ, σ]:
Fw(σ) ≡ maxEw⊆W
|Ew|=σp′
∫
Ew
(U ′p−Uw(ı))dı, and Fp(σ) ≡ maxEp⊆P
|Ep|=(1−σ)p′
∫
Ep
1[Up(ı) ≤ U ′p](U ′p−Up(ı)+δ)dı. [A.1.6]
These functions represent the maximum contributions to the net strength of the rebel army from those who
are currently workers and those who are currently elite members. Maximization is over the compositions
of the subsequent elite from among current workers and current elite members respectively, taking as given
the fraction σ of places in the subsequent elite assigned to current workers. The general no-rebellion
constraint [A.1.4] imposes an upper bound on the sum of the effective fighting strengths of workers and
current elite members in the rebel army for all new elite selection functions, that is, for all compositions of
the subsequent elite. This constraint therefore holds if and only if it holds for the maximized contributions
of workers and elite members for all possible values of σ. Therefore, [A.1.4] is equivalent to
F (σ) ≡ Fw(σ) +Fp(σ) ≤ δp for all σ ∈ [σ, σ], [A.1.7]
with bounds σ and σ from [A.1.5]. Another equivalent form of the constraint is to state it in terms of the
maximized value of F (σ), the sum of Fw(σ) and Fp(σ), over all values of σ:
F ‡ ≡ max
σ∈[σ,σ]
F (σ) ≤ δp. [A.1.8]
Therefore, equilibrium institutions maximize U¯p subject to the above constraint, the non-negativity con-
straints, p < 1/2, and the elite selection function P = E (p).
Note that the constraint [A.1.8] must be binding. Suppose first the non-negativity constraints are slack.
If it were the case that F ‡ < δp then taxes on all workers could be increased by some strictly positive
amount, with the proceeds distributed to members of the elite. It is clear from the definition of Fw(σ)
in [A.1.6] that Fw(σ) is continuous with respect to this tax change. Furthermore, with Up(ı) no lower for
any ı ∈ P, the definition of Fp(σ) implies that Fp(σ) is no larger for any σ ∈ [σ, σ], while U¯p is strictly
increased. Therefore, there is some positive tax increase that ensures F ‡ remains below δp, and is thus
feasible.
Now consider a case where some non-negativity constraints are binding. These cannot be binding on all
individuals. Since any Markovian equilibrium must feature Up(ı) ≥ U¯w, non-negativity constraints could
be binding only for workers and possibly those elite members receiving the minimum in the distribution of
elite payoffs. It follows that there exists a positive measure of elite members at or below the average elite
payoff for whom non-negativity constraints are not binding. Consider a deviation whereby some positive
measure of these individuals are expelled from the elite and now face taxes that give them a payoff lower by
some strictly positive amount than what they previously received. Suppose the extra resources following
this deviation are distributed among the remaining elite members. This strictly increases the average elite
payoff, and continues to satisfy the no-rebellion constraints for sufficiently small changes since these are
continuous. There is thus a profitable deviation in both cases, so the constraint F ‡ ≤ δp must be binding.
Now consider a Markovian equilibrium. Since p′ = p = p∗, and p∗ < 1/2, it follows from [A.1.5] that
σ = 0 and σ = 1. The Markovian equilibrium institutions must therefore maximize U¯p subject to
F ∗‡ ≡ max
σ∈[0,1]
F ∗(σ) ≤ δp∗, [A.1.9]
where F ∗(σ), F ∗w(σ) and F ∗p (σ) denote the functions in [A.1.7] and [A.1.8] evaluated using the Markovian
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equilibrium payoffs.
Payoff equalization among workers
Conjecture that there is a Markovian equilibrium in which a positive measure of workers receive payoffs
U∗w(ı) different from the average U¯∗w.
Suppose first that F ∗(0) < F ∗‡. Each worker’s payoff is U∗w(ı) = u(C∗w(ı)), where C∗w(ı) = q − τ∗(ı)}
are the consumption levels implied by the distribution of taxes specified by the Markovian equilibrium
institutions. Let C¯w denote the level of consumption required to give a worker the average utility of all
workers in the Markovian equilibrium, that is, u(C¯w) = U¯∗w. Since the utility function u(·) is weakly
concave, Jensen’s inequality implies
u
(
1
|W|
∫
W
C∗w(ı)dı
)
≥ 1|W|
∫
W
u(C∗w(ı))dı = U¯∗w = u(C¯w).
The utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, so this means that
C¯w ≤ 1|W|
∫
W
C∗w(ı)dı.
Consider the following deviation from the Markovian equilibrium institutions. Each worker faces the same
tax, and the level of this tax implies that all workers receive consumption C¯w. The equation above shows
that this deviation does not reduce the resources available to finance the elite’s consumption. Any extra
resources are distributed among the elite, so that they now receive consumption Cp(ı) ≥ C∗p(ı). Let Up(ı)
denote the payoffs of elite members after the deviation, which must satisfy Up(ı) ≥ U∗p(ı) for all ı ∈ P.
Let Fp(σ) be the function from [A.1.6] calculated using the new distribution of elite payoffs, while F ∗p (σ)
is the corresponding function calculated using the payoffs in the conjectured Markovian equilibrium. The
definition in [A.1.6] implies that Fp(σ) ≤ F ∗p (σ) for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
After the deviation, all workers ı ∈ W receive the same payoff Uw(ı) = U¯w, which by construction is
equal to U¯∗w. The definition of Fw(σ) in [A.1.6] and U ′p = U¯∗p then imply that Fw(σ) = σp∗(U¯∗p − U¯∗w) for
all σ ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that in a Markovian equilibrium, p′ = p∗ < 1/2, so it follows that σp∗ < 1 − p∗ = |W| for all
σ ∈ [0, 1]. This means that for any σ ∈ [0, 1], the set of workers included in the subsequent elite following
a rebellion always leaves out some positive measure of workers from the rebel army. Hence, with payoff
inequality among a positive measure of workers in the Markovian equilibrium, it must be the case that the
smallest possible integral of the workers’ payoffs in the rebel army is less than the average worker payoff
multiplied by the number of workers in the rebel army (when the measure of workers included is positive):
min
Ew⊆W
|Ew|=σp∗
∫
Ew
U∗w(ı)dı < σp∗U¯∗w, for all σ ∈ (0, 1].
Therefore, noting the definition in [A.1.6]:
F ∗w(σ) = maxEw⊆W
|Ew|=σp∗
∫
Ew
(U¯∗p − U∗w(ı))dı > σp∗(U¯∗p − U¯∗w) = Fw(σ), for all σ ∈ (0, 1].
Together with the earlier result Fp(σ) ≤ F ∗p (σ) for all σ ∈ [0, 1], the equation above establishes that
F (σ) < F ∗(σ) for all σ ∈ (0, 1]. Now take any σ‡ ∈ [0, 1] that solves the maximization problem from
[A.1.9], that is, F ∗(σ‡) = F ∗‡. Since F ∗(0) < F ∗‡ in the case under consideration, this value must satisfy
σ‡ > 0. The analysis above has shown F (σ‡) < F ∗(σ‡) for any such σ‡, and therefore F ‡ < F ∗‡, where
F ∗‡ and F ‡ are respectively the maximized values of the function in [A.1.9] before and after the deviation.
Since F ∗‡ = δp∗, it follows that F ‡ < δp∗, so the no-rebellion constraint is slack after the deviation. It
has been seen how to increase U¯p starting from this point by raising taxes, while continuing to satisfy the
no-rebellion constraint [A.1.9].
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The remaining case to consider is F ∗(0) ≥ F ∗‡. The definition of F ∗‡ in [A.1.9] implies F ∗(0) ≤ F ∗‡,
so this case is equivalent to F (0) = F ∗‡.
The definition of Fw(σ) in [A.1.6] implies that as the share σ of current workers offered places in the
subsequent elite increases, those joining the strongest rebel army would have current payoffs that are no
lower than those who have already joined. Thus, the average payoff of those workers in the strongest rebel
army for a given σ cannot decrease as σ increases. Consequently, Fw(σ)/σ must be weakly decreasing
in σ. Together with Fw(0) = 0, this implies the function Fw(σ) is weakly concave in σ. A similar
argument applies to Fp(σ), so Fp(σ)/(1 − σ) is weakly increasing in σ (the average is weakly decreasing
in the proportion 1− σ of places in the subsequent elite offered to current elite members). Together with
Fp(1) = 0, this means that (Fp(σ) − Fp(1))/(σ − 1) is weakly decreasing in σ, hence Fp(σ) is weakly
concave. It follows that the sum F (σ) = Fw(σ) +Fp(σ) is also a weakly concave function of σ.
Note that equation [A.1.9] together with F ∗(0) = F ∗‡ implies F ∗(σ) ≤ F ∗(0) for all σ ∈ [0, 1], which
means that F ∗(σ) cannot have a positive slope at σ = 0. Since F ∗(σ) is weakly concave for all σ ∈ [0, 1],
the slope of F ∗(σ) cannot increase with σ, so it must be the case that F ∗(σ) is weakly decreasing for
all σ ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that when σ = 0, all members of the current elite can be offered places in the
subsequent elite because p′ = p∗ in a Markovian equilibrium. If F ∗w(σ) + F ∗p (σ) cannot increase with
σ then this says that the net strength of the rebel army is never increased by increasing the share of
positions in the subsequent elite (and hence places in the rebel army) assigned to current workers. This can
only happen if the highest possible contribution to the fighting strength of the rebel army from a positive
measure of workers is never more than the lowest net contribution by a positive measure of current elite
members. Given the definitions of F ∗w(σ) and F ∗p (σ) in [A.1.6], this condition can be stated formally as:
sup
{
f
∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ W | U¯∗p − U∗w(ı) ≤ f}∣∣ < 1} ≤ inf {f ∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ P |1[U∗p(ı) ≤ U¯∗p ](U¯∗p − U∗p(ı) + δ) ≤ f}∣∣ > 0} .
[A.1.10]
The existence of payoff inequality among a positive measure of workers in the Markovian equilibrium
implies there must be a positive measure of workers ı ∈ W such that
U¯∗p − U∗w(ı) ≤ sup
{
f
∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ W | U¯∗p − U∗w(ı) ≤ f}∣∣ < 1}− ∆, for some ∆ > 0.
Consider a new distribution of taxes on workers that increases the tax on all workers satisfying the condition
above by a strictly positive amount, but one that does not lower these workers’ utilities by more than ∆.
All other workers’ taxes are unaffected. Let Uw(ı) denote workers’ payoffs after this deviation from the
conjectured Markovian equilibrium. Given the condition above and [A.1.10], the new worker payoffs satisfy
the inequality:
sup
{
f
∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ W | U¯∗p − Uw(ı) ≤ f}∣∣ < 1} ≤ sup{f ∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ W | U¯∗p − U∗w(ı) ≤ f}∣∣ < 1}
≤ inf
{
f
∣∣∣ ∣∣{ı ∈ P |1[U∗p(ı) ≤ U¯∗p ](U¯∗p − U∗p(ı) + δ) ≤ f}∣∣ > 0} .
If the function Fw(σ) is defined using the new distribution of worker payoffs then the inequality above
demonstrates that the sum Fw(σ) +F ∗p (σ) is weakly decreasing for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
The extra tax revenue generated by the deviation considered above is distributed among the elite,
ensuring the new elite payoffs satisfy Up(ı) ≥ U∗p(ı) for all ı ∈ P. The average elite payoff U¯p is strictly
increased because taxes are increased by a positive amount on a positive measure of workers. The function
Fp(σ) is calculated using the new distribution of elite payoffs, and equation [A.1.9] shows this satisfies
Fp(σ) ≤ F ∗p (σ) for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
By putting these results together and noting that Fw(0) = F ∗(0) = 0:
F (σ) ≡ Fw(σ) +Fp(σ) ≤ Fw(σ) +F ∗p (σ) ≤ Fw(0) +F ∗p (0) = F ∗w(0) +F ∗p (0) = F ∗‡ = δp∗,
and hence F (σ) ≤ δp∗ for all σ ∈ [0, 1] after the tax change. This shows that the no-rebellion constraint
remains satisfied, while the elite objective function is increased.
Therefore, payoff inequality for a positive measure of workers is not consistent with Markovian equilib-
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rium. Any equilibrium must feature U∗w(ı) = U¯∗w for all ı ∈ W (except for measure-zero sets of workers).
Payoff equalization among members of the elite
Since payoff equalization U∗w(ı) = U∗w has been established for all workers (up to measure zero sets) in
any Markovian equilibrium, with U ′p = U¯∗p the function Fw(σ) from [A.1.6] reduces to
F ∗w(σ) = σp
∗(U¯∗p − U∗w). [A.1.11]
The definition of F ∗p (σ) from [A.1.6] makes it clear that F ∗p (1) = 0, so since any equilibrium institutions
must satisfy the no-rebellion constraint [A.1.9], it follows that F ∗w(1) = F ∗(1) ≤ F ∗‡ = δp∗. With the
equation above, this implies:
U¯∗p − U∗w ≤ δ. [A.1.12]
Suppose there is a Markovian equilibrium with U¯∗p−U∗w < δ. Starting from such institutions, consider the
following deviation. First, redistribute consumption equally among elite members so that all elite members
receive the average C¯∗p specified by the conjectured Markovian equilibrium institutions. Let Cp(ı) = C¯∗p
denote the new distribution of elite consumption and Up(ı) = u(Cp(ı)) the elite payoffs after the deviation.
Given the weak concavity of the utility function u(·), Jensen’s inequality implies
Up(ı) = u(C¯∗p) = u
(
1
|P|
∫
P
C∗p(ı)dı
)
≥ 1|P|
∫
P
u(C∗p(ı))dı = U¯∗p . [A.1.13]
A second change made to the conjecture Markovian equilibrium institutions is a strictly positive tax increase
levied equally on all workers. This is chosen to be sufficiently small so that U¯∗p − Uw ≤ δ holds, where Uw
is the common payoff of all workers after the deviation. The proceeds of the tax are distributed among the
elite, so the average elite payoff U¯p is strictly larger. Furthermore, using the inequality in [A.1.13], it must
be the case that Up(ı) ≥ U¯∗p for all ı ∈ P after the deviations.
Since U ′p = U¯∗p in a Markovian equilibrium, Up(ı) ≥ U¯∗p implies that for all ı ∈ P:
1[Up(ı) ≤ U ′p](U ′p − Up(ı) + δ) ≤ δ.
As a result, the functionFp(σ) from [A.1.6] (calculated using the elite members’ payoffs after the deviation)
can be bounded above:
Fp(σ) ≤ (1− σ)p∗δ, for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
Following the tax increase, all workers’ payoffs remain equalized, so the equivalent of equation [A.1.11]
holds for the function Fw(σ) calculated using workers’ payoffs after the deviation (and U ′p = U¯∗p), hence
Fw(σ) = σp∗(U¯∗p −Uw) for all σ ∈ [0, 1]. Given that U¯∗p −Uw ≤ δ, it must be the case that Fw(σ) ≤ σp∗δ.
Putting the bounds for Fw(σ) and Fp(σ) together yields:
F (σ) = Fw(σ) +Fp(σ) ≤ σp∗δ+ (1− σ)p∗δ = δp∗, for all σ ∈ [0, 1].
This establishes that the institutions following the deviation from the conjectured Markovian equilibrium
increase U¯p while continuing to satisfy the general no-rebellion constraint [A.1.9]. Therefore, any Markovian
equilibrium must feature U¯∗p − U∗w ≥ δ. Combined with [A.1.12], the following condition necessarily holds
in any Markovian equilibrium:
U¯∗p − U∗w = δ. [A.1.14]
Now consider the possibility that there is a Markovian equilibrium in which there is inequality among
a group of elite members with positive measure. This means there must be a positive measure of elite
members with payoffs U∗p(ı) strictly below the average U¯∗p . In a Markovian equilibrium, U ′p = U¯∗p , so it
follows that for these members of the elite:
1[U∗p(ı) ≤ U ′p](U∗p(ı) ≤ U ′p + δ) > δ.
As the fraction of places in the subsequent elite assigned to current workers approaches σ = 1, the measure
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of elite members who can join the rebel army becomes arbitrarily small. Using the definition of Fp(σ) from
[A.1.6] and the continuity of the integral, it must be the case for all σ < 1 sufficiently close to 1 that the
following holds:
F ∗p (σ) > (1− σ)p∗δ. [A.1.15]
Since payoff equalization has already been shown to be a property of any Markovian equilibrium, equations
[A.1.11] and [A.1.14] imply:
F ∗w(σ) = σp
∗(U¯∗p − U∗w) = σp∗δ.
Together with the inequality from [A.1.15], it follows that for some σ ∈ (0, 1):
F ∗(σ) > σp∗δ+ (1− σ)p∗δ = δp∗.
This demonstrates that F ∗‡ > δp∗, violating the general no-rebellion constraint in [A.1.9].
Therefore, payoff inequality among a positive measure of elite members is inconsistent with the necessary
properties of any Markovian equilibrium derived earlier. Any equilibrium must feature U∗p(ı) = U¯∗p for all
ı ∈ P (except for measure-zero sets of elite members).
Power determines rents
With U∗p(ı) = U¯∗p for all ı ∈ P, this means that U¯∗p = U¯∗p , so equation [A.1.14] implies U∗p = U∗w + δ.
Reduction to a single no-rebellion constraint
With payoff equalization among all workers and among all elite members, the choice of institutions
reduces to a choice of elite size p (with identities determined by the elite selection function) and a common
level of taxes τ levied on workers (with elite consumption then determined by the resource constraint).
Equilibrium institutions are then the solution to the following maximization problem
max
p,τ
Up subject to σ(U ′p − Uw) + (1− σ)1[Up ≤ U ′p](U ′p − Up + δ) ≤ δ
p
p′
for all σ ∈ [σ, 1], [A.1.16]
and subject to the other constraints (non-negative consumption, p < 1/2). The general form of the no-
rebellion constraint is derived from [A.1.3] after payoff equalization is assumed, with σ denoting the fraction
of places in the post-rebellion elite assigned to those who are currently workers. The bound σ is defined in
equation [A.1.5] (note that the constraint p < 1/2 implies σ = 1). A Markovian equilibrium is a solution
(p∗, τ∗) of the maximization problem [A.1.16] taking p′ and U ′p as given, but with p′ = p∗ and U ′p = U∗p in
equilibrium.
Now consider a simpler maximization problem where the no-rebellion constraint in [A.1.16] is imposed
only for σ = 1:
max
p,τ
Up subject to U ′p − Uw ≤ δ
p
p′
, [A.1.17]
and subject to the non-negativity constraints on consumption and p < 1/2. A Markovian equilibrium of
this alternative problem is defined as a solution (p?, τ?) of the maximization problem [A.1.17], taking p′
and U ′p as given, but with p′ = p? and U ′p = U?p in equilibrium.
Start by considering a Markovian equilibrium (p?, τ?) of the simpler problem [A.1.17]. Since these
institutions must satisfy the no-rebellion constraint from [A.1.17] and p′ = p? and U ′p = U?p , it follows that
U?p − U?w ≤ δ. Therefore, for any σ ∈ [0, 1]:
σ(U?p − U?w) + (1− σ)1[U?p ≤ U?p ](U?p − U?p + δ) = σ(U?p − U?w) + (1− σ)δ ≤ σδ+ (1− σ)δ = δ = δ
p?
p?
.
This demonstrates that (p?, τ?) satisfies the no-rebellion constraint of the original problem [A.1.16] when
p′ = p? and U ′p = U?p . Now take any other institutions (p, τ) not subject to rebellion in the original
problem [A.1.16], again when p′ = p? and U ′p = U?p . Evaluating the no-rebellion constraint at σ = 1 yields
U?p −Uw ≤ δp/p?, which shows that these institutions also satisfy the no-rebellion constraint of the simpler
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problem [A.1.17]. Since (p?, τ?) maximizes Up over all institutions satisfying the constraint in [A.1.17],
it must be the case that Up ≤ U?p for any institutions (p, τ) consistent with the constraint in [A.1.16].
Therefore, (p?, τ?) is also a Markovian equilibrium of [A.1.16] as well.
Now consider the converse. Take a Markovian equilibrium (p∗, τ∗) of the original problem [A.1.16].
These institutions are clearly consistent with the constraint in [A.1.17] when p′ = p∗ and U ′p = U∗p because
the constraint is a special case of that in [A.1.16] when σ = 1. Suppose for contradiction that (p∗, τ∗) is
not a Markovian equilibrium of the problem [A.1.17]. Since it satisfies the no-rebellion constraint, it must
therefore be the case that there exists another set of institutions (p, τ) such that Up > U∗p satisfying the
no-rebellion constraint in [A.1.17] when p′ = p∗ and U ′p = U∗p . Now take any σ ∈ [σ, 1] and multiply both
sides of the inequality in [A.1.17] by this number to obtain:
σ(U∗p − Uw) ≤ σδ
p
p∗
≤ δ p
p∗
.
Observe that (1− σ)1[Up ≤ U∗p ](U∗p − Up + δ) = 0, so this demonstrates that (p, τ) satisfies [A.1.16] for all
σ ∈ [σ, 1]. Since these institutions satisfy the no-rebellion constraint in [A.1.16], the resulting elite payoff
cannot be higher than the elite payoff in equilibrium, hence Up ≤ U∗p . This contradicts the inequality
Up > U∗p obtained earlier, and thus proves that (p∗, τ∗) must be a Markovian equilibrium of the simpler
problem [A.1.17].
In summary, it has been shown that the set of Markovian equilibria of the original problem [A.1.16] is
identical to the set of Markovian equilibrium of the simpler problem [A.1.17]. Therefore, there is no loss of
generality in imposing [3.9] as the only no-rebellion constraint.
Existence and uniqueness of the Markovian equilibrium
With payoff equalization, the resource constraint implies Cp = (1 − p)τ/p. Worker and elite payoffs
are given by Uw = u(q − τ) and Up = u((1 − p)τ/p) respectively. It has been shown that the Markovian
equilibrium institutions can be characterized as a solution of [A.1.17]. Any Markovian equilibrium (p∗, τ∗)
is thus a solution of the maximization problem
max
p,τ
u
(
(1− p)τ
p
)
subject to U∗p − u(q− τ) ≤ δ
p
p∗
, [A.1.18]
taking p∗ and U∗p as given, but with p = p∗ and Up = U∗p in equilibrium. The solution of the maximization
problem must also respect the constraint p < 1/2, and the non-negativity constraints on all individuals’
consumption, which are equivalent to 0 ≤ τ ≤ q here.
It has already been seen that the no-rebellion constraint must be binding, which was reduced to a single
equation in [A.1.18]. This equation can be solved to obtain τ as a function of p for given values of p∗ and
U∗p :
τ = q− u−1
(
U∗p − δ
p
p∗
)
. [A.1.19]
Differentiating shows that the constraint implicitly specifies a positive relationship between τ and p:
∂τ
∂p
=
δ
p∗
1
u′
(
u−1
(
U∗p − δ pp∗
)) > 0. [A.1.20]
The problem [A.1.18] is equivalent to maximizing Cp = (1− p)τ/p over values of p after substituting for τ
using equation [A.1.19]:
max
p
(1− p)
p
(
q− u−1
(
U∗p − δ
p
p∗
))
, [A.1.21]
subject to p < 1/2 and the value of τ implied by [A.1.19] being such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ q. Taking the derivative
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of Cp with respect to p (making use of [A.1.20]):
∂Cp
∂p
=
1
p2
 p
p∗
δ(1− p)
u′
(
u−1
(
U∗p − δ pp∗
)) − (q− u−1(U∗p − δ pp∗
)) . [A.1.22]
The second derivative is
∂2Cp
∂p2
= − 2
u′
(
u−1
(
U∗p − δ pp∗
)) δp
p∗
+
u′′
(
u−1
(
U∗p − δ pp∗
))
{
u′
(
u−1
(
U∗p − δ pp∗
))}3 − 2p ∂Cp∂p . [A.1.23]
In a Markovian equilibrium it is necessary to have p = p∗, in which case the binding no-rebellion
constraint [A.1.19] reduces to
τ∗ = q− u−1(U∗p − δ),
or equivalently
u
(
(1− p∗)(q− C∗w)
p∗
)
= U∗p = u(q− τ∗) + δ = u(C∗w) + δ, [A.1.24]
where C∗w = q− τ∗ is the consumption of a worker. This equation is in turn equivalent to
p∗u−1(u(C∗w) + δ) = (1− p∗)(q− C∗w). [A.1.25]
Evaluating the derivative of Cp from [A.1.22] at p = p
∗:
∂Cp
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
=
1
p∗2
(
δ(1− p∗)
u′
(
u−1
(U∗p − δ)) − (q− u−1 (U∗p − δ))
)
.
Since [A.1.24] implies that u−1(U∗p − δ) = C∗w, this can be simplified as follows:
∂Cp
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
=
1
p∗2
(
δ(1− p∗)
u′ (C∗w)
− (q− C∗w)
)
. [A.1.26]
Now define the following functions G (p,κ) and U (p,κ), which will represent respectively (with κ = Cw)
the no-rebellion constraint and the first-order condition in a Markovian equilibrium:
G (p,κ) ≡ pu−1(u(κ) + δ)− (1− p)(q− κ), U (p,κ) ≡ δ(1− p)− (q− κ)u′(κ). [A.1.27]
The no-rebellion constraint [A.1.25] for a Markovian equilibrium holds when G (p∗, C∗w) is zero, while the
derivative of Cp in [A.1.26] is proportional to U (p∗, C∗w):
G (p∗, C∗w) = 0, and
∂Cp
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗
=
1
p∗2
1
u′(C∗w)
U (p∗, C∗w). [A.1.28]
The partial derivatives of the function G (p,κ) from [A.1.27] are:
∂G
∂p
= u−1(u(κ) + δ) + (q− κ), ∂G
∂κ
= p
u′(κ)
u′ (u−1(u(κ) + δ))
+ (1− p). [A.1.29]
Since u(·) is strictly increasing, u′(κ) > 0 and u′(u−1(u(κ) + δ)) > 0, and also u−1(u(κ) + δ) > κ. It
follows that both of the partial derivatives above are strictly positive for all 0 ≤ p < 1/2 and 0 ≤ κ ≤ q.
The partial derivatives of the function U (p,κ) from [A.1.27] are:
∂U
∂p
= −δ, ∂U
∂κ
= u′(κ)− (q− κ)u′′(κ). [A.1.30]
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The properties of u(·) ensure that u′(κ) > 0 and u′′(κ) ≤ 0, so U (p,κ) is strictly decreasing in p and
strictly increasing in κ.
Now consider two functions H (p) and V (p) defined implicitly by the equations:
G (p,H (p)) = 0, and U (p,V (p)) = 0. [A.1.31]
Where these functions are defined, the signs of their partial derivatives can be deduced using [A.1.29] and
[A.1.30]:
H ′(p) = −∂G
∂p
/∂G
∂κ
< 0, and V ′(p) = −∂U
∂p
/∂U
∂κ
> 0. [A.1.32]
Observe from [A.1.27] thatU (1,κ) = −(q−κ)u′(κ), with the definition [A.1.31] then implying V (1) = q
given u′(·) > 0. [A.1.32] shows that V (p) is strictly increasing in p, so it follows by continuity that either
there exists a pi > 0 such that V (pi) = 0, or V (0) ≥ 0, in which case pi is set to zero. With the resulting
pi ∈ [0, 1), define κ ≡ V (pi), noting that this satisfies 0 ≤ κ < q because V (pi) ≥ 0 and V (1) = q. The
function V (p) is then well defined on the interval [pi, 1] in the sense of returning a value of κ in the interval
[κ, q].
It can be seen from [A.1.27] that G (0,κ) = −(q − κ), so the definition in [A.1.31] implies H (0) = q.
Note that since the utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, so is its inverse u−1(·). It follows that
u−1(u(κ) + δ) > κ and thus for all p > 0:
G (p,κ) > pκ − (1− p)(q− κ) = κ − q(1− p).
Using [A.1.31], this means that 0 = G (p,H (p)) >H (p)− q(1− p), and hence
H (p) < q(1− p), for all p > 0.
[A.1.32] shows that H (p) is strictly decreasing in p, so given H (0) = q and the bound above, it follows
by continuity that there exists a pi ∈ (0, 1) such that H (pi) = 0. The function H (p) is then well defined
on the interval [0, pi] in the sense of returning a value of κ in the interval [0, q].
Let H −1(κ) denote the inverse function of H (p), defined on [0, q]. Similarly, V −1(κ) is the inverse
function of V (p), defined on [κ, q], where 0 ≤ κ ≡ V (pi) < q. Since H (p) is strictly decreasing and V (p)
is strictly increasing according to [A.1.32], their inverse functions inherit these properties. Now define the
following function A (κ) on [κ, q]:
A (κ) ≡ V −1(κ)−H −1(κ), [A.1.33]
where the properties of H (p) and V (p) imply that A (κ) is strictly increasing in κ. Note also that
A (q) = 1− 0 = 1 since H (0) = q and V (1) = q.
Consider first the case where pi < pi. The definition [A.1.33] and V (pi) = κ imply:
A (κ) = pi −H −1(κ).
The definition of pi was such that pi = 0 if κ > 0, and so A (κ) = −H −1(κ). Given that κ < q, H (0) = q,
and H (p) is strictly decreasing, it follows that H −1(κ) > 0, hence A (κ) < 0. When κ = 0, note that
H −1(κ) = pi since H (pi) = 0. This implies that A (κ) = pi − pi < 0 because pi < pi in the case under
consideration. Therefore, it has been shown that A (κ) < 0 and A (q) > 0, thus A (κ) being continuous
and strictly increasing proves there exists a unique value κ∗ ∈ (0, q) such that A (κ∗) = 0.
Consider the remaining case where pi ≥ pi. It is necessary that pi > 0 in this case since pi > 0,
and the definition of pi then guarantees that V (pi) = 0, and κ = 0 because κ = V (pi). Therefore,
A (κ) = A (0) = pi − pi ≥ 0. Since A (κ) is continuous and strictly increasing and A (q) > 0 as before, it
follows that either κ∗ = 0 is the only possible solution of A (κ) = 0 for κ ∈ [0, q], or there is no solution
of the equation. Whether or not a solution exists, set κ∗ = 0 in this case, noting that A (κ∗) ≥ 0.
Depending on which case above prevails there is either A (κ∗) = 0 or A (κ∗) ≥ 0. In both cases, κ∗ < q.
Define p∗ = H −1(κ∗), and since H (p) is strictly decreasing and H (0) = q, it follows that p∗ > 0. The
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definition of H (p) in [A.1.31] also implies that G (p∗,κ∗) = 0. Therefore, using [A.1.27]:
q− κ∗ = p
∗
1− p∗u
−1(u(κ∗) + δ). [A.1.34]
Since A (κ∗) ≥ 0, equation [A.1.33] implies V −1(κ∗) ≥ H −1(κ∗) = p∗. As has been shown in [A.1.30],
U (p,κ) is decreasing in p. The definition [A.1.31] implies U (V −1(κ),κ) = 0, hence it then follows that
U (p∗,κ∗) ≥ 0. Using [A.1.27]:
q− κ∗ ≤ δ(1− p
∗)
u′(κ∗)
,
and combining this with [A.1.34] yields:
p∗
1− p∗u
−1(u(κ∗) + δ) ≤ δ(1− p
∗)
u′(κ∗)
.
Therefore, the following inequality must hold:
u−1(u(κ∗) + δ) ≤ (1− p
∗)2
p∗
δ
u′(C∗w)
. [A.1.35]
Now note that since u(·) is a concave function, its inverse u−1(·) is a convex function, so it is bounded
below by its tangent at u(κ∗). Together with κ∗ ≥ 0, this leads to:
u−1(u(κ∗) + δ) ≥ u−1(u(κ∗)) + 1
u′(u−1(u(κ∗)))
δ = κ∗ +
δ
u′(κ∗)
≥ δ
u′(κ∗)
.
By combining this the earlier inequality in [A.1.35]:
δ
u′(κ∗)
≤ (1− p
∗)2
p∗
δ
u′(κ∗)
, and hence 1 ≤ (1− p
∗)2
p∗
.
Therefore, the value of p∗ must satisfy the quadratic inequality B(p∗) ≥ 0 where:
B(p) ≡ (1− p)2 − p = p2 − 3p+ 1.
Since B(0) > 0 and B(1) < 0, the quadratic B(p) has exactly one root p ∈ (0, 1). The product of the
roots is positive, so this must be the smallest root, which can then be obtained using the formula:
p =
3−√5
2
= 2−
(
1 +
√
5
2
)
= 2−ϕ, [A.1.36]
where ϕ ≡ (1 + √5)/2 is the Golden ratio introduced in footnote 6. As B(p∗) ≥ 0, it must be the case
that p∗ ≤ p, and therefore p∗ ≤ 2−ϕ.
Given the constraint p < 1/2, the search for a Markovian equilibrium is restricted to the interval
p ∈ [0, 1/2]. The non-negativity constraints on consumption are equivalent to 0 ≤ Cw ≤ q, where Cw = q−τ .
Equation [A.1.17] shows that the value of τ consistent with the binding no-rebellion constraint is strictly
increasing in p. Since the utility function u(·) is strictly increasing and weakly concave, equations [A.1.22]
and [A.1.23] imply that any critical point of the objective function Cp must be a local maximum. Therefore,
these observations show that the general necessary and sufficient condition for a Markovian equilibrium is:
∂Cp
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=p∗

≤ 0 if p∗ = 0 or C∗w = q
= 0 if 0 < p∗ < 1/2 and 0 < C∗w < q
≥ 0 if p∗ = 1/2 or C∗w = 0
. [A.1.37]
Consider first the possibility of a Markovian equilibrium with p∗ = 0 or C∗w = q. Equation [A.1.28] and
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[A.1.31] imply that C∗w = H (p∗), and since H (0) = q it follows that any such equilibrium must feature
p∗ = 0 and C∗w = q. Thus, by using [A.1.27], U (p∗, C∗w) = δ > 0. From equation [A.1.28] it follows that
∂Cp/∂p → ∞ at p∗ = 0. But the first-order condition [A.1.37] would require ∂Cp/∂p ≤ 0 for this type of
equilibrium. Therefore, there are no Markovian equilibria with either p∗ = 0 or C∗w = q.
Now consider the possibility of a Markovian equilibrium with p∗ = 1/2. From the relevant first-
order condition in [A.1.37] and [A.1.28], such an equilibrium would need to satisfy U (p∗, C∗w) ≥ 0 and
G (p∗, C∗w) = 0. But it has been shown that p∗ ≤ p for any value of p∗ consistent with these conditions,
where p is defined in [A.1.36]. It can be seen that p < 1/2, so there are no Markovian equilibria with
p∗ = 1/2.
Next, consider a case of a Markovian equilibrium with 0 < p∗ < 1/2 and 0 < C∗w < q. Using [A.1.37]
and [A.1.28], the required conditions are G (p∗, C∗w) = 0 and U (p∗, C∗w) = 0. From [A.1.31], this is seen to
be equivalent to p∗ = H −1(C − w∗) and p∗ = V −1(C∗w), and to A (C∗w) = 0 using [A.1.33]. In the case
where pi < pi such a solution has been shown to exist, and to be unique. There is no solution when pi ≥ pi.
Therefore, a Markovian equilibrium of this type exists (and is unique among those of this type) if and only
if pi < pi.
Finally, consider the case of a Markovian equilibrium with C∗w = 0. According to [A.1.28], this must
satisfy G (p∗, 0) = 0, and hence p∗ = H −1(0) using [A.1.31]. Using [A.1.37] and [A.1.28], the first-order
condition in this case requires U (p∗, 0) ≥ 0. The definition in [A.1.31] implies U (V −1(0), 0) = 0, and
since [A.1.30] shows U (p,κ) is strictly decreasing in p, it follows that U (H −1(0), 0) ≥ 0 if and only if
V −1(0) ≥ H −1(0). This is seen to be equivalent to A (κ∗) ≥ 0 using [A.1.33]. The earlier analysis shows
this inequality is satisfied if and only if pi ≥ pi. Hence a unique Markovian equilibrium exists in this case
too.
Therefore, irrespective of whether pi < pi or pi ≥ pi holds, a unique Markovian equilibrium exists. In
the case pi < pi, the equilibrium features 0 < C∗w < q, so all non-negativity constraints are slack. In the
case pi ≥ pi, the equilibrium features C∗w = 0, so the non-negativity constraint is binding for workers. In all
cases, 0 < p∗ ≤ 2−ϕ < 1/2.
Define the following normalized value of the parameter δ:
β ≡ δ
u′(0)q
. [A.1.38]
Using this definition, observe from [A.1.27] that U (0, 0) = u′(0)q(β− 1). Hence, if β ≥ 1 then it must be
the case that U (0, 0) ≤ 0. Note that U (0,V (0)) = 0 follows from the definition in [A.1.31], which implies
V (0) ≥ 0 since U (p,κ) is strictly increasing in κ according to [A.1.30]. The earlier construction of pi is
such that pi = 0 whenever V (0) ≥ 0. As pi > 0, it follows that pi < pi, and thus that the unique Markovian
equilibrium does not have a binding non-negativity constraint for workers.
Now suppose that β > 1, in which case U (0, 0) > 0 using the argument above. It follows that pi > 0,
with this variable defined as pi = V −1(0). Given [A.1.31], this means that pi satisfies U (pi, 0) = 0, and by
using [A.1.27]:
δ(1− pi)− u′(0)q = 0.
Solving this equation explicitly in terms of the parameter β defined in [A.1.38] yields:
pi =
β− 1
β
, [A.1.39]
The term pi is always defined as the solution of the equation G (pi, 0) = 0. Equation [A.1.27] then leads to
piu−1(u(0) + δ) = (1− pi)q,
which can be rearranged as follows:
pi
1− pi =
q
u−1(u(0) + δ)
.
Observe from [A.1.39] that pi/(1−pi) = β− 1. The inequality pi < pi is equivalent to pi/(1−pi) < pi/(1−pi).
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By using the equation above, pi < pi is also equivalent to:
β < 1 +
q
u−1(u(0) + δ)
. [A.1.40]
Substituting for β from [A.1.38] thus provides the necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium with
all non-negativity constraints being slack since pi < pi is necessary and sufficient for this.
Finally, note that since the utility function u(·) is weakly concave, its inverse u−1(·) is weakly convex.
That implies
u−1(u(0) + δ) ≥ u−1(u(0)) + 1
u′(u−1(u(0)))
δ =
δ
u′(0)
,
and by using the definition of β from [A.1.38]:
q
u−1(u(0) + δ)
≤ β−1.
Now suppose condition [A.1.40] holds. Putting [A.1.40] together with the inequality above yields:
β < 1 + β−1, or equivalently Φ(β) < 0 where Φ(β) ≡ β2 − β− 1.
The quadratic equation Φ(β) = 0 has a positive and a negative root, and since Φ(0) < 0, the function
Φ(β) takes negative values when β lies strictly between its two roots. Observe that Φ(ϕ) = 0, so the
Golden ratio ϕ ≡ (1 +√5)/2 is the positive root. The condition Φ(β) < 0 then requires β < ϕ, so this is
a necessary condition for an equilibrium with no binding non-negativity constraints. It follows that β ≥ ϕ
is then sufficient for an equilibrium with a binding non-negativity constraint for workers since this is the
only other possible equilibrium. This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a Markovian equilibrium {p∗, τ∗q (ı), τ∗κ , C∗p(ı)} in which a positive fraction s∗ of investment oppor-
tunities are taken.
There are always sufficient non-elite members or workers to fill a rebel army following a rebellion at any
stage
At the pre-investment stage, individuals outside the elite do not yet know whether they will be investors
or workers. The number of non-elite members is n = 1 − p, so given that p < 1/2 and p′ < 1/2, n will
always exceed p′, the size of the subsequent elite following a rebellion at the pre-investment stage.
At the post-investment stage, workers are those outside the elite who did not become investors. Their
number is w = 1− p− i. At this point, any rebellion would feature a subsequent elite size of p†. Observe
that
w − p† = (1− p− i)− p† = (1− p)− µ+ (µ− i)− p† =
(
(1− p)− 1
2
)
+
(
1
2
− p† − µ
)
+ (1− s)µ,
where µ is the measure of investment opportunities, and i = µs, given the definition in [5.7]. The formula
for p† from [5.5] implies
1
2
− p† = q
2(q + 2δ)
,
and hence
w − p† =
(
(1− p)− 1
2
)
+
(
q
2(q + 2δ)
− µ
)
+ (1− s)µ > 0,
for all parameters consistent with [5.3] and all feasible values of p and s. Therefore, w > p†, so there are
always sufficient workers to fill a rebel army at the post-investment stage.
Payoff equalization for workers
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Suppose a Markovian equilibrium features a non-degenerate distribution of taxes {τ∗q (ı)} on economi-
cally active individuals, and hence dispersion in worker payoffs {U∗w(ı)}. Following the argument in Proposi-
tion 1, in the case where no workers belong to a rebel army associated with a binding no-rebellion constraint,
it would be possible for the elite to increase taxes on a subset of workers without violating any no-rebellion
constraint by targeting the tax increases on those receiving higher payoffs (and the increase in elite pay-
offs cannot increase fighting effort from elite members who join a rebel army). The second case is where
some workers belong to a rebel army associated with a binding no-rebellion constraint. Since workers (or
non-elite members at the pre-investment stage) are more numerous than the maximum number of places
in the rebel army, no rebel army can include all of them. Payoff equalization among workers thus strictly
reduces the fighting effort of any rebel army including a positive number of workers. This slackens the
binding no-rebellion constraints and allows the elite to raise taxes. Since a higher elite payoff is feasible in
both cases, there are no Markovian equilibria with payoff inequality among a set of workers with positive
measure.
Therefore, the search for a Markovian equilibrium can be restricted to those that feature payoff equal-
ization for all workers, that is, a single tax on the endowment τq and a common payoff Uw(ı) = Uw for all
ı ∈ W. Taxes can always be raised to ensure Uw ≤ U†p(K) without any danger of rebellion, and this would
raise the elite’s payoff, so U†p(K) is an upper bound for worker payoffs in equilibrium. Given that there
are always sufficient workers at the post-investment stage, σ†w = 1 is feasible in the general no-rebellion
constraint [5.11] at the post-investment stage. Therefore, the following no-rebellion constraint must always
hold:
U†p(K)− Uw ≤ δ
p
p†
. [A.2.1]
No investors in a rebel army with a binding constraint at the post-investment stage
Ex post, investors receive the common payoff Uk given in [5.8] (given a equal tax distribution τq(ı) = τq
and an equal tax τκ on capital — the latter is without loss of generality as discussed in footnote 31.
Comparison with [5.6] shows that Uk = Uw + (κ− τκ), and given the incentive compatibility condition for
investors from [5.7], this implies:
Uk = Uw + θ˜. [A.2.2]
Since 0 < ψ ≤ θ˜ ≤ κ according to [5.1], any Markovian equilibrium must feature θ˜∗ > 0. Hence,
U∗k = U∗w + θ˜∗ > U∗w. Therefore, in an equilibrium with s∗ > 0, there is a positive measure of investors, but
it can be seen from [5.11] that these would exert strictly less fighting effort than any worker included in
the rebel army. Since it has been shown there are enough workers to fill the whole rebel army, investors
would never be included in a rebel army associated with a binding no-rebellion constraint. Therefore, in
what follows, the search for a Markovian equilibrium can be confined to cases where the restriction σ†i = 0
is imposed on the general no-rebellion constraint in [5.11].
The general no-rebellion constraint at the post-investment stage
In what follows, let σ denote the fraction of places in the subsequent elite (and hence positions in the
rebel army) that are filled by those who are currently workers if a rebellion occurs at the post-investment
stage. Define the function R(σ):
R(σ) ≡ δ p
p†
− 1
p†
max
Ep⊆P
|Ep|=(1−σ)p†
∫
Ep
1[Up(ı) ≤ U†p(K)]{U†p(K)− Up(ı) + δ}dı− σ(U†p(K)− Uw), [A.2.3]
where U†p(K) is the payoff of an elite member under the institutions that would be formed following a post-
investment rebellion, and is p† the subsequent elite size, as given in [5.5]. The function above is defined
for a given distribution of elite payoffs Up(ı). The set Ep denotes the subset of the current elite P who are
offered places in the subsequent elite, which can be varied by considering different elite selection functions
E ′(·). However, even if ı ∈ Ep, elite member ı ∈ P is only willing to join the rebel army if Up(ı) ≤ U†p(K).
If that condition is not met, this member of the elite will belong to the incumbent army.
47
Using the argument from Proposition 1, it can be seen that the set of relevant post-investment no-
rebellion constraints (given payoff equalization for workers and σ†i = 0) is equivalent to
R(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [σ, 1], where σ ≡ max
{
0,
p† − p
p†
}
. [A.2.4]
The term σ is the minimum number of places in the subsequent elite that can be offered to those who are
currently workers given the sizes of the current and subsequent elites (note that a rebel army with σ = 1
is feasible because there are always enough workers to fill all places in the subsequent elite).
Reduction to single no-rebellion constraint at the pre-investment stage
The argument here follows Proposition 1. The set of Markovian equilibria imposing the full range
of pre-investment no-rebellion constraints (and the appropriate post-investment constraints) is the same
as the set of Markovian equilibria in which the only constraint imposed at the pre-investment stage is
for a rebel army drawn solely from non-elite members (of whom there is always a sufficient number).
Therefore, the only relevant pre-investment stage no-rebellion constraint sets σp = 0 in [5.11] to obtain
max{U ′p−Un, 0} ≤ δp/p′, where an expression for the expected utility Un of a non-elite member is given in
[5.10]. Since the right-hand side of the inequality is non-negative, it is equivalent to:
U ′p − Un ≤ δ
p
p′
. [A.2.5]
The elite’s objective function and the distribution of elite payoffs
Let C¯p denote average elite consumption and U¯p average elite utility. The utility function is linear
in consumption, so Up(ı) = Cp(ı), and thus U¯p = C¯p. Using the elite’s budget constraint, the measure of
investors i = µs, and the incentive compatibility condition for investors from [5.7], which implies τκ = κ− θ˜,
average elite utility and consumption are given by:
U¯p = C¯p = (1− p)τq + iτκ
p
=
(1− p)τq + µ(κ− θ˜)s
p
. [A.2.6]
This is the elite’s objective function that is maximized when new institutions are created. Note that it does
not directly depend on the distribution of elite consumption owing to the linearity of the utility function.
Take any distribution of elite consumption {Cp(ı)}, and the consequent distribution of elite payoffs
{Up(ı)}. Let λ denote the fraction of elite members receiving a payoff strictly greater than U†p(K), and let
γ denote the amount on average by which Up(ı) exceeds U†p(K) for this group of elite members. Finally, let
Uˇp denote the average payoff for the fraction 1 − λ of elite members receiving a payoff less than or equal
to U†p(K). Given the linearity of utility in consumption, these variables are related to the overall average
elite payoff U¯p as follows:
U¯p = λ(U†p(K) + γ) + (1− λ)Uˇp.
This equation can be solved for Uˇp taking λ and γ as given:
Uˇp = U¯p − λ(U
†
p(K) + γ)
1− λ , and hence U
†
p(K)− Uˇp =
U†p(K)− U¯p + λγ
1− λ . [A.2.7]
Now define ω(λ) to be the minimum fraction of places in the rebel army filled by workers if the λ
fraction of current elite members are not to be offered a place in the subsequent elite:
ω(λ) ≡ max
{
0,
p† − (1− λ)p
p†
}
, [A.2.8]
with ω(λ) being no less than the physical lower bound σ defined in [A.2.4]. Given the distribution of elite
payoffs, a fraction λ of elite members will not join a rebel army even if included in the subsequent elite
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because they would receive a higher payoff if the current institutions survive. Such elite members are effec-
tively loyal, in that they cannot be induced to leave the incumbent army and join the rebels. Consequently,
for any σ ∈ [σ, ω(λ)), it must be the case that R(σ) ≥ R(ω(λ)), so the no-rebellion constraints [A.2.4]
are redundant for σ values in this range. It is necessary and sufficient only to verify that R(σ) ≥ 0 for all
σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1].
Now take the general distribution of elite payoffs {Up(ı)} and hypothetically suppose that all con-
sumption levels for those with payoffs less than or equal to U†p(K) were equalized (with no change to the
distribution of consumption for those with a payoff above this threshold). Given linearity of utility, it
follows that with this new distribution of elite payoffs, a fraction 1− λ all receive the same payoff Uˇp from
[A.2.7], with the remaining fraction λ all having payoffs above U†p(K). Let C (σ) denote the equivalent of
the function R(σ) from [A.2.3] defined using this alternative distribution of elite payoffs, where σ ∈ [σ, 1] is
as before the fraction of places in the rebel army assigned to those who are currently workers. Since those
elite members with Up(ı) ≤ U†p(K) all have the same payoff Uˇp, the function C (σ) can be written explicitly
(making use of the corresponding definition of R(σ) in [A.2.3]) as follows:
C (σ) = δ
p
p†
− σ(U†p(K)− Uw)−
{
(1− ω(λ))(U†p(K)− Uˇp + δ) if σ ∈ [σ, ω(λ));
(1− σ)(U†p(K)− Uˇp + δ) if σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1].
[A.2.9]
Using the argument developed in Proposition 1, payoff equalization among those elite members currently
receiving no more than U†p(K) cannot increase the net fighting strength of the rebel army (but the same
need not be true for payoff equalization among all elite members including those with payoffs above U†p(K)).
Since the functions C (σ) and R(σ) represent the net fighting strengths of the incumbent army with and
without payoff equalization among the 1− λ fraction of the elite, it follows that
R(σ) ≤ C (σ) for all σ ∈ [σ, 1]. [A.2.10a]
Consider a case where σ ∈ (ω(λ), 1). This means that not all places in the rebel army are taken by workers,
while there are more than enough current elite members (the fraction 1 − λ) willing to fill the remaining
places. Given that only a subset of these individuals can actually be included, this subset will be those
most dissatisfied with their current payoffs. Hence, if there is a positive measure of elite members with
Up(ı) ≤ U†p(K) and Up(ı) 6= Uˇp, the argument from Proposition 1 shows that
R(σ) < C (σ) for all σ ∈ (ω(λ), 1). [A.2.10b]
Now define a function N (λ) ≡ C (ω(λ)) using ω(λ) from [A.2.8] and C (σ) from [A.2.9]. Equation
[A.2.9] implies
N (λ) = δ
(
p− (1− ω(λ))p†
p†
)
− (1− ω(λ))(U†p(K)− Uˇp)− ω(λ)(U†p(K)− Uw), [A.2.11]
for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, define the threshold λ# where for λ ≥ λ#, a positive measure of workers
would be required to fill the rebel army after including all the 1− λ fraction of current elite members who
are willing to join. This threshold is formally defined as follows:
λ# ≡ max
{
0, 1− p
†
p
}
, [A.2.12]
observing that 0 ≤ λ# < 1. First, consider the case where λ ∈ [0, λ#). If there is a λ in this range then
necessarily λ# > 0, and hence 1− λ# = p†/p. Since λ < λ# in this case, it follows that (1− λ)p > p†, and
thus ω(λ) = 0 according to the definition in [A.2.8]. Therefore the expression for N (λ) in [A.2.11] reduces
to:
N (λ) = δ
(
p− p†
p†
)
− (U†p(K)− Uˇp) = δ
(
p− p†
p†
)
−
(
U†p(K)− U¯p + λγ
1− λ
)
, [A.2.13a]
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where the second equality uses the relationship between U†p(K)− Uˇp and U†p(K)− U¯p in [A.2.7].
Next, consider the remaining case where λ ∈ [λ#, 1]. Using [A.2.12], it follows that λ ≥ 1 − p†/p, and
hence (1− λ)p ≤ p†. Given this inequality, the definition in [A.2.8] implies that
ω(λ) = 1− (1− λ) p
p†
.
By substituting this into the expression for N (λ) from [A.2.11]:
N (λ) = δ
p
p†
− δ(1− λ) p
p†
− (1− λ) p
p†
(U†p(K)− Uˇp)−
(
1− (1− λ) p
p†
)
(U†p(K)− Uw).
Making some simplifications to the above and using [A.2.7] to substitute for Uˇp in terms of U¯p:
N (λ) = λδ
p
p†
− p
p†
(U†p(K)− U¯p)−
p
p†
λγ −
(
1− p
p†
)
(U†p(K)− Uw)− λ
p
p†
(U†p(K)− Uw),
and then after collecting terms in λ:
N (λ) =
p
p†
(δ+ Uw − U†p(K)− γ)λ−
p
p†
(U†p(K)− U¯p)−
(
1− p
p†
)
(U†p(K)− Uw). [A.2.13b]
Equations [A.2.13a] and [A.2.13b] provide a complete specification of the functionN (λ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1]:
N (λ) =
δ
(
p−p†
p†
)
−
(
U†p(K)−U¯p
1−λ
)
− λ1−λγ if λ ∈ [0, λ#);
p
p† (δ+ Uw − U
†
p(K)− γ)λ− pp† (U
†
p(K)− U¯p)−
(
1− p
p†
)
(U†p(K)− Uw) if λ ∈ [λ#, 1].
[A.2.14]
The functionN (λ) is seen to be continuous for all λ ∈ [0, 1] since the two branches coincide when evaluated
at λ = λ#, as defined in [A.2.12].
Time inconsistency problem for members of the elite
Equation [5.6] giving the payoff of a worker implies τq = q−Uw, so the average elite payoff [A.2.6] can
be written as:
U¯p = (1− p)(q− Uw) + µ(κ− θ˜)s
p
.
This expression can be rearranged as follows:
U¯p =
(1− p)
(
q + δ p
p† − U
†
p(K)
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
p
−
(
1− p
p
)(
Uw − U†p(K) + δ
p
p†
)
,
from which an expression for U†p(K)− U¯p can be obtained:
U†p(K)− U¯p =
1
p
(
U†p(K)−
(
(1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p†
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
))
+
(
1− p
p
)(
Uw − U†p(K) + δ
p
p†
)
.
[A.2.15]
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Substituting for U†p(K) from [5.5] and rearranging the first term in brackets yields:
U†p(K)−
(
(1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p†
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
)
=
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
+K − (1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p†
)
− µκs+ µθ˜s
= (q + δ)(1− p†) + µκs− q(1− p)− δ
p†
p+
δ
p†
p2 − µκs+ µθ˜s
=
δ
p†
(
p2 − p+ qp
†
δ
p+
p†
δ
(
(q + δ)(1− p†)− q
))
+ µθ˜s
=
δ
p†
(
p2 −
(
1− q
q + 2δ
)
p+
p†
δ
(
(q + δ)2 − q(q + 2δ)
q + 2δ
))
+ µθ˜s
=
δ
p†
(
p2 − 2
(
δ
q + 2δ
)
p+ p†
(
δ
q + 2δ
))
+ µθ˜s
=
δ
p†
(
p2 − 2p†p+ p†2
)
+ µθ˜s =
δ
p†
(
p− p†
)2
+ µθ˜s.
[A.2.16]
Since θ˜ > 0, whenever s > 0 the final term in the above is strictly positive. The other term is non-negative,
hence:
U†p(K)−
(
(1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p†
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
)
> 0. [A.2.17]
The no-rebellion constraint [A.2.1] for workers at the post-investment stage implies
U†p(K)− Uw + δ
p
p†
≥ 0,
and taking this together with [A.2.15] and [A.2.17], it is proved that for any s > 0:
U†p(K) > U¯p. [A.2.18]
This says that the elite payoff following a rebellion at the post-investment stage is always strictly larger
than any feasible average elite payoff with no rebellion. As a consequence, there must be an upper bound
less than one for feasible values of λ. Given the non-negativity constraints, Uˇp ≥ 0, so equation [A.2.7]
implies λ ≤ λ, where
λ ≡ U¯p
U†p(K) + γ
,
with [A.2.18] demonstrating that 0 < λ < 1.
The pre-investment no-rebellion constraint cannot bind on its own
Consider first the possibility of a Markovian equilibrium with s > 0 in which the pre-investment stage
constraint [A.2.5] is the only effective binding no-rebellion constraint. With p′ = p∗ and U ′p = U∗p , the
binding constraint [A.2.5] implies
U∗p − Un = δ
p
p∗
.
Combining this with the expressions for the non-elite expected payoff Un from [5.10] and the worker payoff
Uw from [5.6]:
Uw = U∗p − δ
p
p∗
− αSi(θ˜) = U∗p − δ
p
p∗
− µ
1− pSi(θ˜), [A.2.19]
where the formula for the probability α of receiving an investment opportunity is taken from [5.9]. The
tax τq = q− Uw is then given by:
τq = q + δ
p
p∗
+
µ
1− pSi(θ˜)− U
∗
p .
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Substituting this into the elite’s objective function U¯p in equation [A.2.6]:
U¯p =
(1− p)
(
q + δ pp∗ − U∗p
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s+ µSi(θ˜)
p
. [A.2.20]
The first-order condition for maximizing U¯p with respect to p (taking p∗ and U∗p as given) is:
1
p
(
(1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p∗
− U∗p
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s+ µSi(θ˜)
)
= (1− p) δ
p∗
−
(
q + δ
p
p∗
− U∗p
)
,
and after imposing the Markovian equilibrium conditions p = p∗ and U¯p = U∗p and making use of [A.2.20]:
U∗p = δ
(1− p∗)
p∗
− (q + δ− U∗p) .
Solving this equation for p∗ yields:
p∗ =
δ
q + 2δ
= p†,
given the expression for p† in [5.5].
Using equation [A.2.19], the equilibrium payoff of workers is U∗w = U¯∗p − δ− αSi(θ˜), which implies
δ+ U∗w − U†p(K)− γ = −(U†p(K)− U¯∗p)− αSi(θ˜)− γ. [A.2.21]
This is strictly negative because U†p(K)− U¯∗p > 0 according to [A.2.18]. This finding, in combination with
p∗ = p†, implies that N (λ) is strictly negative for all λ using the formula in [A.2.11]. Note that R(ω(λ)) ≤
C (ω(λ)) = N (λ) < 0 given the definitions and [A.2.10a]. Therefore, the no-rebellion constraint for a rebel
army at the post-investment stage including elite members, represented by the inequality R(σ) ≥ 0, is
violated for some feasible value of σ. It follows that a Markovian equilibrium with this configuration of
binding constraints does not exist.
The post-investment no-rebellion constraint including only workers cannot bind on its own
Now consider the possibility of a Markovian equilibrium featuring s > 0 with workers’ post-investment
constraint [A.2.1] as the only effective binding no-rebellion constraint. When the inequality in [A.2.1] binds:
Uw = U†p(K)− δ
p
p†
, [A.2.22]
from which can be found an expression for tax τq = q− Uw as a function of p:
τq = q + δ
p
p†
− U†p(K).
This is substituted into the expression for the average elite payoff [A.2.6] to obtain:
U¯p =
(1− p)
(
q + δ p
p† − U
†
p(K)
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
p
. [A.2.23]
Taking the derivative of U¯p with respect to p:
∂U¯p
∂p
=
1
p
(
(1− p) δ
p†
−
(
q + δ
p
p†
− U†p(K)
))
− 1
p2
(
(1− p)
(
q + δ
p
p†
− U†p(K)
)
+ µ(κ− θ˜)s
)
,
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and by using the expressions for U¯p and p† from [A.2.23] and [5.5] respectively:
∂U¯p
∂p
=
1
p
(
δ
p†
− q− 2δ p
p†
+ (U†p(K)− U¯p)
)
=
1
p
(
2
δ
p†
(p† − p) + (U†p(K)− U¯p)
)
. [A.2.24]
Exploiting the fact that [A.2.22] holds in this case, equations [A.2.15] and [A.2.16] imply that:
U†p(K)− U¯p =
1
p
(
δ
p†
(p− p†)2 + µθ˜s
)
, [A.2.25]
and by substituting this into [A.2.24]:
∂U¯p
∂p
=
1
p2
(
2
δ
p†
(p† − p)p+ δ
p†
(p− p†)2 + µθ˜s
)
=
δ
p2p†
(
p†
(
p† +
µθ˜s
δ
)
− p2
)
. [A.2.26]
Now make the following definition of the function pi(s):
pi(s) ≡ p† + µθ˜s
δ
. [A.2.27]
The condition pi(s) < 1/2 is equivalent to µθ˜s/δ < 1/2− p†, and hence to:(
1
2
− p† − µ
)
+
(
1− s θ˜
δ
)
µ > 0.
After substituting the formula for p† in [5.5] and using the bound on µ from [5.3], the first term is seen to
be non-negative. Since θ ∈ [ψ, κ], it follows that θ˜ ≤ κ. The restrictions in [5.3] then ensure θ˜ < δ, which
together with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 implies the second term above is strictly positive. It follows that pi(s) < 1/2 for
all s ∈ [0, 1] with parameters consistent with the stated restrictions in [5.3].
Using the definition of pi(s) in [A.2.27] and equation [A.2.26], the derivative of U¯p can be written as:
∂U¯p
∂p
=
δ
p2p†
(
p†pi(s)− p2
)
. [A.2.28]
It follows that U¯p is strictly increasing in p for p <
√
p†
√
pi(s), and strictly decreasing for p >
√
p†
√
pi(s).
The first-order condition for maximizing the expression in [A.2.23] for U¯p incorporating the binding con-
straint is therefore p∗ =
√
p†
√
pi(s). It can be seen from [A.2.27] that p† < pi(s) for any s > 0, and it is
known that pi(s) < 1/2, so it follows that p† < p∗ < 1/2.
Given that p∗ > p†, it can be seen from the definitions in [A.2.4] and [A.2.12] that σ = 0 and λ# > 0.
Since [A.2.8] implies ω(0) = σ, it then follows from [A.2.11] that
N (0) = δ
(
p− p†
p†
)
− (U†p(K)− U¯p).
Thus, the statement N (0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
U†p(K)− U¯p ≤ δ
(
p− p†
p†
)
. [A.2.29]
In the case under consideration where [A.2.1] is binding, an expression for the left-hand side of the above
is given in [A.2.25], so N (0) ≥ 0 holds if and only if
δ
p†
(p− p†)2 + µsθ˜ ≤ δ
p†
(p− p†)p.
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Simplification of the terms appearing in the inequality above show that it is equivalent to p ≥ pi(s), with
pi(s) as defined in [A.2.27]. But the first-order condition p∗ =
√
p†
√
pi(s) implies p∗ < pi(s) since pi(s) > p†
for s > 0. Therefore, an equilibrium of this type requires N (0) < 0.
Now note that the binding workers’ no-rebellion constraint [A.2.22] implies
δ+ U∗w − U†p(K)− γ = −δ
(
p∗ − p†
p†
)
− γ. [A.2.30]
As p∗ > p†, it is therefore established that δ+U∗w−U†p(K)− γ < 0. From [A.2.11], in the range λ ∈ [λ#, 1],
this implies that N (λ) is strictly decreasing. In the range λ ∈ [0, λ#), differentiating [A.2.11] reveals that
N ′(λ) = −(U†p(K)−U¯p +γ)/(1−λ)2. Since [A.2.18] justifies U†p(K)−U¯∗p > 0, this proves that the function
N (λ) is strictly decreasing for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. AsN (0) < 0, it follows thatN (λ) < 0 for all λ. Consequently,
R(ω(λ)) ≤ C (ω(λ)) = N (λ) < 0, which violates R(σ) ≥ 0 (the post-investment no-rebellion constraint
for elite members) for a feasible value of σ. This shows that there cannot be a Markovian equilibrium with
the conjectured configuration of binding no-rebellion constraints.
Both pre- and post-investment no-rebellion constraints cannot be binding for non-elite members, nor can
the maximum elite size constraint be binding
In analysing this case, consider first the possibility of a Markovian equilibrium with s > 0 in which the
pre-investment constraint [A.2.5] is binding. This leads to the expression for U¯p given in [A.2.20]. After
imposing the Markovian equilibrium conditions p = p∗ and U∗p = U¯p in that equation:
U∗p = (q + δ)(1− p∗) + µ(κ− θ˜)s+ µSi(θ˜).
It has already been shown that when [A.2.5] binds, equation [A.2.19] for Uw follows. By substituting the
equation above into [A.2.19]:
U∗w = q(1− p∗)− δp∗ + µ(κ− θ˜)s− µ
p∗
1− p∗Si(θ˜).
This can be substituted into [A.2.1] to obtain a condition for p∗ to satisfy the post-investment no-rebellion
constraint for workers:
U†p(K)− q(1− p∗) + δp∗ − µ(κ− θ˜)s+ µ
p∗
1− p∗Si(θ˜) ≤ δ
p∗
p†
.
Using the expressions for U†p(K) and p† from [5.5], and K = µκs from [5.7], it can be seen that U†p(K)−q =
δp† + µκs. By substituting this into the inequality above it is seen to be equivalent to
δp† + (q + δ)p∗ + µθ˜s+ µ
p∗
1− p∗Si(θ˜) ≤
δ
p†
p∗.
Noting that [5.5] implies δ/p† = q + 2δ, the inequality above can be rearranged to yield(
1− µ
1− p∗
Si(θ˜)
δ
)
p∗ ≥ pi(s), [A.2.31a]
where pi(s) is defined in [A.2.27].
Now start from the case where the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers [A.2.1] is binding
at p = p∗. The condition needed for a Markovian equilibrium (p′ = p∗ and U ′p = U∗p) of this type to satisfy
the pre-investment stage no-rebellion constraint [A.2.5] is
U∗p − U∗n ≤ δ.
The expected payoff Un for non-elite members is given in equation [5.10]. Using [5.6] and the formula for
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α from [5.9], it follows that U∗n = U∗w + (µ/(1− p∗))Si(θ˜). Substituting this into the inequality above shows
that [A.2.5] is satisfied if and only if
U∗p − U∗w −
µ
1− p∗Si(θ˜) ≤ δ.
A binding post-investment constraint [A.2.1] for workers implies that U∗w = U†p(K)− δp∗/p†, which can be
substituted into the condition above to obtain:
δ
p∗
p†
− δ− µ
1− p∗Si(θ˜) ≤ U
†
p(K)− U∗p .
Equation [A.2.22] (the binding version of [A.2.1]) has already been shown to imply the expression for
U†p(K)− U¯p in [A.2.25]. Since U¯∗p = U∗p , this can be used to deduce that the inequality above is equivalent
to:
δ
p†
(p∗ − p†)p∗ − µ p
∗
1− p∗Si(θ˜) ≤
δ
p†
(p∗ − p†)2 + µθ˜s.
After some rearrangement, this condition can be written as
p∗ − p† − µ p
∗
1− p∗
Si(θ˜)
δ
≤ µθ˜s
δ
,
which can be stated in terms of the function pi(s) from [A.2.27]:(
1− µ
1− p∗
Si(θ˜)
δ
)
p∗ ≤ pi(s). [A.2.31b]
Note that if both constraints [A.2.5] and [A.2.1] are binding in a Markovian equilibrium then both [A.2.31a]
and [A.2.31b] must hold, hence: (
1− µ
1− p∗
Si(θ˜)
δ
)
p∗ = pi(s). [A.2.32]
The expected surplus to those receiving an investment opportunity is Si(θ˜), which is defined in equation
[5.10]. The probability distribution of the effort cost θ in [5.1] has density function 1/(κ − ψ) on support
[ψ, κ], so an explicit expression for the surplus is:
Si(θ˜) =
∫ θ˜
θ=ψ
θ˜− θ
κ−ψdθ =
1
2
(θ˜−ψ)2
κ−ψ . [A.2.33]
The parameter restrictions in [5.3] require κ < δ. Together with ψ ≤ θ˜ ≤ κ and 0 < ψ < κ, this implies
Si(θ˜) ≤ 1
2
(κ−ψ) < κ
2
<
δ
2
. [A.2.34]
Now define the function M (p) as follows and calculate its derivative:
M (p) ≡
(
1− µ
1− p
Si(θ˜)
δ
)
p, and M ′(p) = 1− 1
1− p
µ
1− p
Si(θ˜)
δ
. [A.2.35]
Given the parameter restrictions in [5.3], the formula α = µ/(1−p) from [5.9] always returns a well-defined
probability for p ≤ 1/2. Given that p ≤ 1/2 implies 1/(1 − p) ≤ 2 and [A.2.34] implies Si(θ˜)/δ < 1/2, it
follows from [A.2.35] that M ′(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1/2]. Noting that M (0) = 0 and pi(s) > 0 according
to [A.2.27], the equation M (p∗) = pi(s) has at most one solution p∗ satisfying 0 < p∗ < 1/2. When
such a solution exists, it follows immediately from [A.2.35] that p∗ > pi(s) because Si(θ˜)/δ < 1/2 and
α = µ/(1− p∗) ≤ 1. Observe that the equation M (p∗) = pi(s) is equivalent to the condition in [A.2.32] for
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both constraints to be binding.
In the case where no solution p∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) exists, set p∗ = 1/2, and since M (0) = 0 and M ′(p) > 0 it
must be the case that M (p∗) = M (1/2) < pi(s). Since it has been shown that pi(s) < 1/2 for the function
pi(s) defined in [A.2.27], it follows that p∗ > pi(s). Note that this case is consistent with [A.2.31b], but
not [A.2.31a], which means that it could only occur in conjunction with the post-investment no-rebellion
constraint for workers being binding, while the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint is slack.
Now consider a deviation from either of the conjectured equilibria described above, an elite size satisfying
0 < p∗ < 1 and both no-rebellion constraints binding, or p∗ = 1/2 with the pre-investment no-rebellion
constraint slack. Workers’ post-investment no-rebellion constraint binds in both cases. The deviation
involves changing the elite size p, while taxes are adjusted so that the post-investment no-rebellion constraint
for workers continues to bind, in which case the payoff of a worker is given in equation [A.2.22]. The
condition for the new choice of p to be consistent with the pre-investment stage constraint (with p′ = p∗
and U ′p = U∗p taken as given at their conjectured equilibrium values) is:
U∗p − Un ≤ δ
p
p∗
, [A.2.36]
where the expected non-elite payoff is obtained using equations [5.6], [5.10], and [A.2.22]:
Un = Uw + µ
1− pSi(θ˜) = U
†
p(K)− δ
p
p†
+
µ
1− pSi(θ˜).
Substituting this expression into [A.2.36] shows that the feasibility of the deviation requires:
U∗p − U†p(K) + δ
p
p†
− µ
1− pSi(θ˜) ≤ δ
p
p∗
,
which can be rearranged as follows:(
1
p†
− 1
p∗
)
p− µ
1− p
Si(θ˜)
δ
≤ U
†
p(K)− U∗p
δ
. [A.2.37]
This inequality is known to be satisfied at p = p∗ because p∗ satisfies the pre-investment no-rebellion
constraint.
Now define the function K (p), and note the following expression for its derivative:
K (p) ≡
(
1
p†
− 1
p∗
)
p− µ
1− p
Si(θ˜)
δ
, and K ′(p) =
1
p†
− 1
p∗
− µ
(1− p)2
Si(θ˜)
δ
. [A.2.38]
Evaluating the derivative at p = p∗:
K ′(p∗) =
1
p†p∗
(
p∗ − p† − µSi(θ˜)
δ
p†
1− p∗
p∗
1− p∗
)
>
1
p†p∗
(
pi(s)− p† − µSi(θ˜)
δ
p†
1− p∗
p∗
1− p∗
)
,
where the inequality above follows from p∗ > pi(s), which is true in all cases under consideration. Since
[A.2.27] implies pi(s)− p† = µθ˜s/δ, the inequality above implies:
K ′(p∗) >
µ
δ
1
p†p∗
(
θ˜s− p
†
1− p∗
p∗
1− p∗Si(θ˜)
)
. [A.2.39]
Note that s = Pθ[θ ≤ θ˜] from [5.7], and use the definition of Si(θ˜) in [5.10] to deduce
θ˜s− Si(θ˜) = Eθθ˜1[θ ≤ θ˜]− Eθ max{θ˜− θ, 0} = Eθθ1[θ ≤ θ˜] ≥ 0,
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and hence Si(θ˜) ≤ θ˜s. Substituting this into [A.2.39] demonstrates that
K ′(p∗) >
µ
δ
θ˜s
p†p∗
(
1− p
†
1− p∗
p∗
1− p∗
)
.
Since p† < p∗ ≤ 1/2, it follows that p†/(1− p∗) < 1 and p∗/(1− p∗) ≤ 1, and thus K ′(p∗) > 0.
The pre-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.36] is equivalent to [A.2.37], which by comparison with
the definition of K (p) in [A.2.38] is in turn equivalent to:
K (p) ≤ U
†
p(K)− U∗p
δ
.
It can be seen from [A.2.38] that K (p) is increasing in p. It is also known that the above inequality is
satisfied at p = p∗. Observing that the right-hand side is unaffected by movements in p away from the
conjectured equilibrium p∗, it then follows that it is possible to reduce p below p∗ and still satisfy the
pre-investment no-rebellion constraint.
Before considering any deviation in p, consider a change in the distribution of elite consumption that
removes all inequality. This entails λ = 0 and Uˇp = U¯p according to [A.2.7]. Since the utility function
is linear, this redistribution of consumption among the elite has no direct effect on U¯p. Given that elite
payoffs are now fully equalized, the functions R(σ) and C (σ) defined in [A.2.3] and [A.2.9] coincide. Since
λ = 0, [A.2.4] and [A.2.8] imply that ω(λ) = σ. Furthermore, as long as it remains the case that p ≥ p†
then σ = 0 according to [A.2.4]. Using R(σ) = C (σ) and equation [A.2.9]:
R(0) = δ
(
p− p†
p†
)
− (U†p(K)− U¯p). [A.2.40]
The constraint R(1) ≥ 0 is equivalent to the workers’ post-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.1], as can
be seen from the definition in [A.2.3]. This no-rebellion constraint is binding in the conjectured equilibrium
and following the proposed deviation, hence R(1) = 0. With payoff equalization, R(σ) inherits linearity
in σ from C (σ), as can be seen by inspecting [A.2.9]. It follows that R(0) ≥ 0 implies R(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ.
The constraint in [A.2.40] is the no-rebellion constraint [A.2.29] for elite members at the post-investment
stage. It has been shown that whenever workers’ post-investment constraint is binding (which is the case
here), the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for the elite is equivalent to p ≥ pi(s). Therefore, starting
from the conjectured equilibrium at p = p∗ > pi(s), it is feasible to reduce p by some positive amount and
continue to satisfy all no-rebellion constraints. Moreover, it has been shown that when the workers’ binding
post-investment constraint is used to determine τq, the derivative of the elite’s objective function U¯p with
respect to p is given by [A.2.28] and is thus strictly decreasing for p >
√
p†
√
pi(s). Since p∗ >
√
p†
√
pi(s),
the proposed deviation is both feasible and payoff-improving for the elite. Hence, there is no Markovian
equilibrium with this configuration of binding constraints.
The pre-investment no-rebellion constraint and some post-investment no-rebellion constraint including elite
members cannot both bind
The general set of no-rebellion constraints at the post-investment stage is given in [A.2.4]. Now conjec-
ture there is an equilibrium with a binding no-rebellion constraint R(σ) = 0 imposed for some σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1),
in addition to the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.5].
Suppose that the conjectured equilibrium features payoff inequality among the 1 − λ fraction of non-
loyal elite members (those with payoff Up(ı) ≤ U†p(K)). Equalizing payoffs among this set of elite members
implies that the function R(σ) becomes C (σ) from [A.2.9], and C (σ) > R(σ) according to [A.2.10b] when
there was payoff inequality among this group initially. This change leads to a slackening of the binding
constraint and thus a strict increase in the elite’s objective function (unless the constraint is redundant, in
which case this problem would reduce to one with only the binding pre-investment no-rebellion constraint
— that case has already been ruled out). Hence, there is no equilibrium of this type in which there is
payoff inequality among the non-loyal elite members and where the constraint R(σ) = 0 must be imposed
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for σ ∈ (ω(λ), 1). Thus, either the equilibrium in this case features payoff equalization among non-loyal
elite members, or the post-investment no-rebellion constraint that needs to be imposed is with σ = ω(λ).
Consider an equilibrium of this type with payoff equalization among the 1−λ fraction of non-loyal elite
members. In this case, the function C (σ) coincides with R(σ). As can be seen from [A.2.9], C (σ) is linear
in σ, so it follows that the general post-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.4] cannot bind at some
σ(ω(λ, 1) but not at σ = ω(λ) (otherwise the constraint would be violated for some other feasible σ value).
Therefore, an equilibrium of this type can always be characterized by imposing the binding post-investment
no-rebellion constraint R(ω(λ)) = 0.
The other binding constraint in this case is the pre-investment constraint [A.2.5]. It has already been
seen that in a Markovian equilibrium with such a binding constraint, equation [A.2.21] must hold. Now
consider the following deviation from the conjectured equilibrium. First, equalize consumption (and hence
payoffs) among the 1 − λ fraction of non-loyal elite members. This implies R(σ) becomes equal to the
function C (σ), which prior to this change was such that C (σ) ≥ R(σ) according to [A.2.10a], so the
general no-rebellion constraint R(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [σ, 1] remains satisfied after the deviation. Following
this, consider a reduction in λ. Given that [A.2.18] and [A.2.21] hold, it can be seen from [A.2.11] that
the function N (λ) is strictly decreasing in λ. Since the definition of C (σ) from [A.2.9] is such that
N (λ) = C (ω(λ)), this means the binding no-rebellion constraint at the post-investment is slackened. As
C (σ) is a linear combination of C (1) (unaffected by any of these changes) and C (ω(λ)) (now strictly
larger), all other post-investment no-rebellion constraints remain satisfied. A higher value of the elite
objective function U¯p is therefore attainable, so there are no equilibria of this type with λ > 0.
Given that any equilibrium must feature λ = 0, it follows from [A.2.8] that ω(λ) = σ. If it were the
case that p∗ ≤ p† then [A.2.4] implies that σ = 1− (p/p†), and hence by using [A.2.9] to evaluate C (σ) at
σ = σ:
R(σ) ≤ C (σ) = − p
p†
(U†p(K)− Uˇp)−
(
1− p
p†
)
(U†p(K)− Uw) < 0,
because U†p(K) > U¯p = Uˇp, as follows from [A.2.18] and [A.2.7] when λ = 0. This violates the general
no-rebellion constraint [A.2.4]. Therefore, a Markovian equilibrium of this type requires p∗ > p†.
When p∗ > p†, any rebel army at the post-investment stage can only include a subset of the elite,
so any equilibrium with a binding post-investment no-rebellion constraint with σ < 1 would be subject
to a profitable deviation by equalizing elite members’ payoffs. Attention can therefore be restricted to
equilibria of this type in which elite payoffs are equalized. Since p∗ > p† and λ = 0, [A.2.4] and [A.2.8]
imply that ω(λ) = σ = 0, so the binding post-investment no-rebellion constraint must be R(0) = 0, using
the expression from [A.2.40] evaluated at elite size p = p∗ and the payoff common to all elite members
U¯p = U∗p . That equation implies U∗p is given by:
U∗p = U†p(K)− δ
p∗
p†
+ δ.
By substituting this expression into equation [A.2.19], which holds in a Markovian equilibrium where the
pre-investment stage no-rebellion constraint is binding:
U∗w =
(
U†p(K)− δ
p∗
p†
+ δ
)
− δ− αSi(θ˜) =
(
U†p(K)− δ
p∗
p†
)
− αSi(θ˜).
Since the investors’ surplus Si(θ˜) is strictly positive in any equilibrium with s > 0, this equation im-
plies workers’ post-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.1] is violated. Therefore there is no Markovian
equilibrium with this configuration of binding constraints.
The case where both post-investment no-rebellion constraints for workers and elite members are binding
Now consider the possibility of an equilibrium where the workers’ post-investment no-rebellion con-
straint and one other post-investment no-rebellion constraint including elite members are binding. The
constraint for workers [A.2.1] is equivalent to R(1) = 0 when binding, using the definition of the function
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R(σ) from [A.2.3]. Suppose that R(σ) = 0 is also imposed for some σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1). Using the same ar-
guments developed in the case of the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for elite members binding in
combination with the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint, it is seen that the binding post-investment
constraint including some elite members must be the one obtained from setting σ = ω(λ). Therefore, the
two binding constraints in this case are R(ω(λ)) = 0 and R(1) = 0.
The binding post-investment constraint for workers is [A.2.22], which has been shown to imply equation
[A.2.30] when this constraint binds in a Markovian equilibrium. Now suppose the Markovian equilibrium
features λ > 0. There are two cases to consider. First, if p∗ > p†, equation [A.2.30] implies that δ +
U∗w − U†p(K) − γ < 0, which together with [A.2.18] demonstrates that the function N (λ) from [A.2.11]
is strictly decreasing in λ. If payoffs among the 1 − λ fraction of non-loyal elite members are equalized
then the function R(σ) reduces to C (σ), which means all the no-rebellion constraints in [A.2.4] continue to
hold given [A.2.10a]. Furthermore, since R(ω(λ)) = C (ω(λ)) = N (λ), decreasing λ slackens the binding
constraint, allowing a higher average elite payoff to be obtained.
Now consider the case where λ > 0 and p∗ ≤ p†. At σ = ω(λ), all the (1 − λ) fraction of non-loyal
elite members would be included in the rebel army, so the distribution of payoffs among them is irrelevant.
Formally, this means that R(ω(λ)) = C (ω(λ)) even when payoffs among non-loyal elite members are not
equalized. Next, substitute the expression for U∗w from the binding no-rebellion constraint [A.2.22] for
workers into the function C (σ) from [A.2.9]:
C (σ) = δ
p∗
p†
− σ
(
δ
p∗
p†
)
− (1− σ)
(
U†p(K)− Uˇ∗p + δ
)
= (1− σ)
(
δ
p∗
p†
− δ− (U†p(K)− Uˇ∗p)
)
.
Equation [A.2.8] shows that ω(λ) < 1 in the case under consideration, and as R(ω(λ)) = 0, it must be the
case that C (ω(λ)) = 0. Using the equation above, this implies:
U†p(K)− Uˇp = δ
p∗
p†
− δ = −δ
(
p† − p∗
p†
)
.
Since p∗ ≤ p†, the right-hand side is less than or equal to zero. However, as U†p(K) > U¯p and U¯p ≥ Uˇp
according to [A.2.18] and [A.2.7], the left-hand side is strictly positive. This is a contradiction, so there
cannot be an equilibrium of this type with λ > 0.
With attention restricted to cases where λ = 0, equation [A.2.8] implies ω(λ) = σ. If it were the case
that p∗ ≤ p† then [A.2.4] reveals that σ = 1− (p/p†), and hence by evaluating [A.2.9] at σ = σ:
R(σ) ≤ C (σ) = −p
∗
p†
(U†p(K)− Uˇ∗p)−
(
1− p
∗
p†
)
(U†p(K)− U∗w) < 0,
making use of [A.2.10a], U†p(K) > U¯p = Uˇp from [A.2.18] and [A.2.7], and U†p(K) > U∗w from [A.2.22]. This
constitutes a violation of one of the no-rebellion constraints [A.2.4], so any equilibrium of this type must
feature p∗ > p†.
If p∗ > p† then any rebel army at the post-investment stage can only include a subset of the elite.
It then follows that any equilibrium with payoff inequality among elite members would be subject to a
profitable deviation because equalizing payoffs would slacken a relevant binding no-rebellion constraint.
In summary, if an equilibrium of this type exists, it must feature λ = 0, payoff equalization among elite
members, and p∗ > p†.
The post-investment no-rebellion constraint for members of the elite cannot bind on its own
Suppose the general post-investment no-rebellion constraint is binding for a rebel army that includes
some positive measure of elite members, but the post-investment no-rebellion constraint including only
workers and the pre-investment constraints are both slack (the cases where elite members’ post-investment
constraint is binding in combination with one or both of these two other no-rebellion constraints have
already been analysed and ruled out). Thus, in terms of the general set of post-investment no-rebellion
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constraints [A.2.4], R(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1] and R(σ) = 0 for some σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1), while R(1) > 0.
The pre-investment stage constraint is also slack, so by evaluating [A.2.5] at a Markovian equilibrium and
using [5.6] and [5.10]:
U∗p − U∗w − αSi(θ˜) < δ. [A.2.41]
Starting from such a conjectured Markovian equilibrium, first consider a deviation whereby payoffs
are equalized among the 1 − λ fraction of non-loyal elite members. Since C (σ) ≥ R(σ) holds prior to
payoff equalization according to [A.2.10a], and as the functions C (σ) and R(σ) coincide following the
payoff equalization, the general post-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.4] remains satisfied after this
deviation. Therefore, C (σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1].
After the deviation described above, first consider the case where now C (σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1].
It would now be possible to make a further deviation by raising the tax τq by some positive amount
and distributing the proceeds to members of the elite. Given [A.2.41], if the change in τq is sufficiently
small then the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.5] continues to hold. Since the increase in elite
members’ payoffs cannot increase their fighting effort if they join a rebel army, the definition of C (σ) in
[A.2.9] implies that C (σ) remains non-negative for all σ following this tax increase, as long as the change in
τq is sufficiently small. Therefore, all the no-rebellion constraints remain satisfied following the deviation,
and the elite objective function U¯p is strictly increased. It must be the case that any equilibrium of this
type features C (σ) = 0 for some σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1] after the initial payoff-equalizing deviation.
The payoff equalization among non-loyal elite members does not affect the post-investment no-rebellion
constraint for workers. Since this constraint remains slack, it follows that C (1) = R(1) > 0. Given that
C (σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1], and C (σ) is linear in σ according to [A.2.9], if C (σ) = 0 for some σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1),
then it must be the case that C (ω(λ)) = 0.
In an equilibrium of this type where C (ω(λ)) = 0, consider an increase in the tax τq by a positive
but sufficiently small amount such that the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers (R(1) =
C (1) ≥ 0) and the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.5] remain satisfied. Since both constraints
are initially slack, it is possible to find such a tax increase. Suppose the proceeds are distributed equally
among only the 1 − λ fraction of non-loyal elite members. Since the tax is levied on all 1 − p∗ non-elite
members and the revenue is shared out among (1 − λ)p∗ non-loyal elite members, if Uw falls by ∆τq, Uˇp
rises by ((1− p∗)/(1− λ)p∗)∆τq. Using equation [A.2.9], the net change in R(ω(λ)) = C (ω(λ)) is
∆C (ω(λ)) = (1− ω(λ))
(
(1− p)
(1− λ)p∆τq
)
− ω(λ)∆τq.
If ω(λ) = 0, the expression above is clearly positive. If ω(λ) > 0 then equation [A.2.8] implies ω(λ) =
1− (1− λ)(p/p†), in which case this can be substituted into the equation above:
∆C (ω(λ)) =
{
(1− λ)p
p†
(1− p)
(1− λ)p − 1 +
(1− λ)p
p†
}
∆τq =
{
1− λp
p†
− 1
}
∆τq.
Note that (1 − λ)p/p† = (1/p† − 2) + (1 − λp), so since [5.5] implies p† < 1/2, it follows that the change
in C (ω(λ)) is positive. Hence, after this deviation, C (ω(λ)) ≥ 0 and C (1) ≥ 0. Given that C (σ) is
linear in σ, it must then be the case that C (σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [ω(λ), 1]. Given that R(σ) = C (σ), all
no-rebellion constraints continue to hold following the deviation, which also strictly increases Uˇp and hence
U¯p. Therefore there is no Markovian equilibrium with this configuration of binding no-rebellion constraints.
The equilibrium configuration of binding constraints
The analysis so far has ruled out all but one configuration of binding no-rebellion constraints: the case
where the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers binds in combination with the no-rebellion
constraint for elite members at the post-investment stage. Furthermore, it has been shown in this case
that a Markovian equilibrium must feature no loyal elite members (λ = 0), full payoff equalization among
all elite members, and a larger elite than would prevail in the equilibrium following a rebellion at the
post-investment stage (p∗ > p†). Therefore, the functions R(σ) and C (σ) from [A.2.3] and [A.2.9] are the
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same, and it can be seen from [A.2.4] and [A.2.8] that ω(λ) = 0. The binding no-rebellion constraints are
thus represented by the equations R(0) = C (0) = 0 and R(1) = C (1) = 0. Note also that when the post-
investment no-rebellion constraint for workers is binding in a Markovian equilibrium, it has been shown
that the constraint C (ω(λ)) = C (0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to p∗ ≥ pi(s), where pi(s) is the function defined in
[A.2.27]. Since both constraints are binding, it follows that p∗ = pi(s).
It remains to verify whether all other no-rebellion constraints are satisfied. Since C (σ) is linear in σ,
the binding constraints at σ = σ = 0 and σ = 1 imply that C (σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ [0, 1], hence [A.2.4] holds.
It has already been shown that when the post-investment no-rebellion constraint for workers is binding,
the pre-investment no-rebellion constraint [A.2.5] is equivalent to the inequality in [A.2.31b]. Hence, with
p∗ = pi(s) and Si(θ˜) > 0, this constraint is automatically satisfied.
The elite’s payoff given the binding constraints
Using the definition in [A.2.9] and subtracting the equation C (1) = 0 from C (0) = 0, it follows that:
Uw = Up − δ.
Substituting this expression for Uw into the elite’s objective function U¯p from equation [A.2.6], and noting
that payoff equalization implies U¯p = Up:
pUp = (1− p)(q− (Up − δ)) + µ(κ− θ˜)s,
and hence by rearranging the above to find an expression for Up:
Up = (q + δ)(1− p) + µ(κ− θ˜)s.
Now substituting for p = pi(s) using the formula for pi(s) from [A.2.27]:
Up = (q + δ)(1− p†) + µ(κ− θ˜)s− µθ˜s
δ
.
Simplifying this expression yields
Up = (q + δ)(1− p†) + µ
(
κ− θ˜
p†
)
s,
and by substituting the formula for p† from [5.5], the expression for Up in [5.12b] is obtained. This completes
the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First, note that the relationship between s and θ˜ in [5.7] implies
θ˜ = ψ+ (κ−ψ)s. [A.3.1]
Given that Proposition 2 shows that the general no-rebellion constraint [5.11] is binding for σ†w = 1 and
for σ†p = 1, by subtracting these equations from one another, it follows that:
Uw = Up − δ. [A.3.2]
The level of investment in the Markovian equilibrium
By substituting the formula for θ˜ from [A.3.1] into the expression for the elite’s payoff in [5.12b]:
Up = (q + δ)
2
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
ψ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
(κ−ψ)s
)
s.
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The derivative with respect to s is
∂Up
∂s
= µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
ψ− 2
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
(κ−ψ)s
)
.
Setting the derivative to zero and solving for s yields
s =
δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
2(q + 2δ)(κ−ψ) =
1
2
δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
(q + 2δ)κ− (q + 2δ)ψ . [A.3.3]
Since q+2δ > δ, this expression can never be more than 1, but could be negative. Given that s is restricted
to s ∈ [0, 1], the value of s that maximizes Up is
s∗ = max
{
0,
δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
2(q + 2δ)(κ−ψ)
}
. [A.3.4]
This is the solution given in [5.16]. It can be seen that s∗ is positive whenever δκ > (q + 2δ)ψ, which is
equivalent to κ/ψ− 1 > 1 + q/δ.
To confirm that this is indeed a Markovian equilibrium, it is necessary to check whether several auxiliary
constraints are satisfied. First, there is the condition from [3.6] that a member of the elite would find it
rational to defend the existing institutions if there is a rebellion where the individual is not included
in the rebel army. This requires U∗p > U ′n = U∗n at the pre-investment stage, and U∗p > U†w(K) at the
post-investment stage.
Note that equations [5.6] and [5.9] imply the following expression for U∗n :
U∗n = U∗w + αSi(θ˜∗).
Given that U∗p = U∗w + δ according to [A.3.2], the condition U∗p > U∗n is equivalent to
αSi(θ˜∗) < δ. [A.3.5]
Using the distribution of the effort cost θ from [5.1] and [5.7], it is known that 0 < ψ < κ and ψ ≤ θ˜∗ ≤ κ.
Hence it must be the case that θ˜∗ − θ < κ for all θ ∈ [ψ, κ], and the definition of Si(θ˜) in [5.10] can then
be used to deduce Si(θ˜∗) < κ. Since α is a probability and κ < δ according to the parameter restrictions
in [5.3], the condition [A.3.5] is verified.
Using the expression for Up from [5.12b], the expression for U†w(K) from [5.5], and the formula for the
capital stock K from [5.7], the condition U∗p > U†w(K) is equivalent to:
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜∗
)
s∗ >
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
− δ+ µκs∗.
After cancelling terms and rearranging, this requirement reduces to:
µ
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜∗s∗ < δ. [A.3.6]
Consider an equilibrium where s∗ > 0, in which case equation [A.3.4] implies
(κ−ψ)s∗ = δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
2(q + 2δ)
,
and where it must be the case that δκ > (q + 2δ)ψ. Substituting this into the formula for θ˜ in [A.3.1]:
θ˜∗ = ψ+
δκ− (q + 2δ)ψ
2(q + 2δ)
=
1
2
((
δ
q + 2δ
)
κ+ψ
)
.
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Given that ψ < κ, it must be the case that ψ < (δ/(q + 2δ))κ, and so the expression above for θ˜∗ implies:
θ˜∗ <
(
δ
q + 2δ
)
κ.
Since µ ≤ 1 and s∗ ≤ 1, and using the parameter restriction κ < δ from [5.3], the inequality above implies
that [A.3.6] must hold, demonstrating that U∗p > U†w(K).
As the utility function is linear, the link between worker and elite payoffs in [A.3.2] implies C∗p = C∗w +δ.
Therefore, all non-negativity constraints on consumption will hold if C∗w ≥ 0, which is equivalent to U∗w ≥ 0.
Observe first that s = 0 is always a feasible choice for the elite in maximizing Up, so if s∗ > 0, it follows
from the expression in [5.12b] that:
µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜∗
)
s∗ ≥ 0. [A.3.7]
Substituting the expression for Up from [5.12b] into [A.3.2] yields:
U∗w =
(
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
− δ
)
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜∗
)
s∗, [A.3.8]
and since [A.3.7] shows the second term is non-negative, a sufficient condition for U∗w ≥ 0 is
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
≥ δ. [A.3.9]
The parameter restriction δ/q ≤ ϕ from [5.3] implies that this inequality holds, so it is confirmed that
C∗w ≥ 0. Therefore, the solution in [A.3.4] is shown to be the unique Markovian equilibrium.
The constrained efficient level of investment
Using the relationship between p and s from [5.12a], it follows that:
δ(1− p) = δ
(
1− p† − µθ˜s
δ
)
= δ(1− p†)− µθ˜s = δ(q + δ)
q + 2δ
− µθ˜s,
where the formula for p† from [5.5] is also substituted into the above expression. The definition of the
average payoff U¯ from [5.14] is equivalent to [5.15], and the expression for (1 − δ)p above can be used to
obtain:
U¯ = (q + δ)
2
q + 2δ
− δ(q + δ)
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + δ
δ
)
θ˜
)
s+ µθ˜s+ µSi(θ˜).
After simplification, this expression for U¯ reduces to:
U¯ = q(q + δ)
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + δ
δ
)
θ˜
)
s+ µSi(θ˜).
Equation [A.3.1] gives a relationship between θ˜ and s, which can also be substituted into the above:
U¯ = q(q + δ)
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + δ
δ
)
−
(
q + δ
δ
)
(κ−ψ)s
)
s+ µSi(θ˜). [A.3.10]
Using [5.1] and [5.10], an explicit expression for the expected surplus Si(θ˜) from receiving an investment
opportunity is given by:
Si(θ˜) =
∫ θ˜
θ=ψ
θ˜− θ
κ−ψdθ =
1
2
(θ˜−ψ)2
κ−ψ =
1
2
(κ−ψ)s2,
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where equation [5.7] has been used to write this solely in terms of s. This is then substituted into [A.3.10]
to obtain an expression for U¯ in terms of s:
U¯ = q(q + δ)
q + 2δ
+ µ
(
κ−
(
q + δ
δ
)
−
(
2q + δ
2δ
)
(κ−ψ)s
)
s. [A.3.11]
Using [A.3.11], the derivative of U¯ with respect to s is:
∂U¯
∂s
= µ
(
κ−
(
q + δ
δ
)
−
(
2q + δ
δ
)
(κ−ψ)s
)
.
Setting the derivative to zero and solving for s yields:
s =
δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(2q + δ)(κ−ψ) =
δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(q + δ)κ− (q + δ)ψ+ q(κ−ψ) . [A.3.12]
Since q+δ > δ and κ > ψ, this expression can never be greater than 1, but it could be negative. Therefore,
if no auxiliary constraints are violated, the constrained efficient level of s is
s = max
{
0,
δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(2q + δ)(κ−ψ)
}
. [A.3.13]
This is the expression for s from [5.16]. It is positive whenever δκ > (q + δ)ψ, which is equivalent to
κ/ψ− 1 > q/δ.
The auxiliary constraints to verify are Up > Un , Up > U†w(K), and Cw ≥ 0. Given that there is the same
configuration of binding no-rebellion constraints, the analysis leading to [A.3.5] also shows that Up > Un
is equivalent to αSi(θ˜) < δ. Under the parameter restrictions from [5.3], this condition is necessarily
satisfied.
Next, consider the constraint Up > U†w(K). Again, given that the configuration of binding no-rebellion
constraints is the same, the analysis leading to [A.3.6] also applies in this case, so the requirement is
equivalent to
µ
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜s < δ. [A.3.14]
Consider a case where s > 0. Using [A.3.13], it must then be the case that
(κ−ψ)s = δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(2q + δ)
,
noting δκ > (q + δ)ψ is necessary. Substituting this into [A.3.1] yields:
θ˜ = ψ+
δκ− (q + δ)ψ
(2q + δ)
=
qψ+ δκ
2q + δ
. [A.3.15]
Since ψ < (δ/(q + δ))κ in this case, it follows that
θ˜ <
q
(
δ
q+δ
)
κ+ δκ
2q + δ
=
δ(2q + δ)κ
(q + δ)(2q + δ)
=
δ
q + δ
κ,
which implies: (
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜ <
q + 2δ
q + δ
κ.
Using the parameter restrictions in [5.3] and the inequality above:
µ
(
q + 2δ
δ
)
θ˜ <
(
q
2(q + 2δ)
)(
q + 2δ
q + δ
)
κ =
1
2
q
q + δ
κ < κ < δ.
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This demonstrates that [A.3.14] holds, which confirms that Up > U†w(K).
Finally, consider the non-negativity constraint Cw ≥ 0 for workers, which is equivalent to Uw ≥ 0 given
the utility function. Substituting the formula for Up from [5.12b] into [A.3.2], and using [A.3.15] to obtain
an expression for θ˜:
Uw =
(
(q + δ)2
q + 2δ
− δ
)
+
µ
δ(q + 2δ)
(δ(q− δ)κ− q(q + 2δ)ψ) s. [A.3.16]
The sign of this expression is ambiguous for general parameters satisfying the restrictions in [5.3], so the non-
negativity constraint for workers could be binding. When this expression is non-negative, the constrained
efficient level of s is indeed given by the formula in [A.3.13] since all other auxiliary constraints are satisfied.
More generally, since the non-negativity constraint is satisfied at s = 0, the possibility that it might be
binding in equilibrium implies that κ/ψ− 1 > q/δ is only a necessary condition for s > 0.
Consider an equilibrium with s > 0. In the case where the non-negativity constraint is not binding,
the value of s is given by [A.3.13]. Comparison with the expression for s∗ in [A.3.4] shows that s∗ < s.
Now suppose the non-negativity constraint is binding. Since the non-negativity constraint is known to be
satisfied at s = 0 and s = s∗, it follows that constrained efficient value of s must be strictly larger than s∗.
Therefore, it is shown that s∗ < s whenever s > 0. This completes the proof.
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